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PREFACE 
This is the 25th of a series of Working Papers prepared for the Pro-Poor Livestock 
Policy Initiative (PPLPI).  The purpose of these papers is to explore issues related to 
livestock development in the context of poverty alleviation.  
Livestock is vital to the economies of many developing countries.  Animals are a 
source of food, more specifically protein for human diets, income, employment and 
possibly foreign exchange.  For low-income producers, livestock can serve as a store of 
wealth, provide draught power and organic fertilizer for crop production and a means 
of transport.  Consumption of livestock and livestock products in developing countries, 
though starting from a low base, is growing rapidly. 
The present study is a part of the PPLPI effort to identify significant political and 
institutional factors and processes that currently hinder or prevent the poor in 
developing countries from taking greater advantage of opportunities to benefit from 
livestock.  Michael Halderman and Michael Nelson’s PPLPI Working Paper No. 18 
identified the development of international sanitary and phytosanitary standards as an 
important factor and suggested further research was needed in this area.  This study 
focuses on what can be done to make international rule-making friendlier to poor 
livestock producer interests if international rules regarding the safety of livestock 
food products are considered a factor.  Another study, carried out by Brian Perry and 
colleagues (PPLPI Working Paper No. 23) seeks to identify the impacts of sanitary and 
phytosanitary (SPS) rules on access to livestock markets by developing countries. 
Disclaimer 
The designations employed and the presentation of material in this publication do not 
imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any 
country, territory, city or area or its authorities or concerning the delimitation of its 
frontiers or boundaries.  The opinions expressed are solely those of the author and do 
not constitute in any way the official position of the FAO. 
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Three trends converged in the 1990s.  Consumers, especially in the developed world, 
became strikingly aware of the vulnerability of their food supplies and the 
international dimensions of food safety hazards, the development of international 
economic law (especially concerning trade) accelerated, and researchers became 
aware of a livestock ‘revolution’ that might help reduce poverty in the developing 
world.  This study considers these trends from the perspective of the poor livestock 
producers in the developing world.  Noting increasing international food safety 
regulation it examines the nature of international food safety rule-making and how 
such international rule-making activity can be made friendlier to their interests. 
In the past, the Codex Alimentarius Commission (Codex) was the agency primarily 
responsible for the development of public international food safety rules, although the 
World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) created some rules relevant to livestock 
food product safety.  These rules took the form of voluntary standards—guidelines for 
state practice and recommendations for protecting human health.   
Since 1995 the World Trade Organization (WTO) has linked the international rules 
created through these organizations to its own rules regarding trade as defined by the 
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures. Especially 
important are provisions for a SPS Committee and links to the WTO’s enforcement 
mechanism (the Dispute Settlement Mechanism). This enforcement mechanism makes 
OIE and Codex rules suddenly appear less voluntary and more important.  
At the same time international rule-making is changing, there is increasing awareness 
of the importance of livestock food products in human consumption and the potential 
associated risks.  One notable trend is that growth in consumption and production of 
these products in developing countries is outpacing that in developed countries.   
Furthermore, what is being called a “livestock revolution” is heralded by some as an 
important route out of poverty.   
All of this raises two questions:  What is the relevance of food safety law to poor 
producers seeking to use livestock as a way out of poverty?  And if any of these rules 
are relevant what can be done to ensure that rule-making processes consider poor 
producer interests?  The primary focus of this study is on this last question. 
To identify strategic entry points for those wishing to make international rule-making 
friendlier to poor livestock producers this study: (a) describes and analyzes the 
international environment that states and other actors face when seeking to influence 
international food safety rules; (b) discusses the roles played by states and other 
actors in creating and enforcing those rules; and (c) analyzes a series of cases 
involving international rule-making for livestock food products. 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
International food safety rules are only one factor among many affecting the 
competitiveness of poor livestock producers.  The basic fact that most of these 
producers do not export means that many of these rules are of little or no direct 
import.  However, as Section Two of this paper explains, international food safety 
standards can have both positive and negative effects.  They should not be ignored.  
While they present the potential to restrict market access for livestock food products 
from developing countries, standards can also benefit both poor producers and poor 
consumers in developing countries if producers are given appropriate technical Executive Summary 
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assistance.  The standards adopted might well be different if better technical 
information about the different circumstances of developing countries and the poor 
within them were presented effectively. 
The WTO, Codex, and OIE are the three most important international organizations for 
livestock food safety rules.  Also important are the relationships in rule-making 
activities among these organizations.  The WTO’s SPS Agreement significantly altered 
the international rule-making environment for food safety.  State strategies to 
influence international rule-making frequently require combined approaches to 
multiple international organizations. 
The interests of poor developing country producers of livestock food products are not 
directly represented in international food safety rule-making.  Indirectly, their 
interests may be represented by their own governments but developing country 
participation in relevant rule-making activity is limited.  Additionally, it is clear that 
developing country government interests will not necessarily be the same as those of 
their own poor producers. 
Influencing the development of rules requires an understanding of the international 
organizational environment and the capacities and interests of relevant actors.   
Specifically, it is important to consider (a) the unique rule-making dynamics of each 
organization; (b) the degree to which these organizations are embedded in other 
international organizations (Codex is embedded in the UN system, for instance); (c) 
the dynamics that formal and informal linkages between these organizations create; 
(d) the relevant differences in capacities of states for participation in these 
organizations; (e) the different situations of repeat players and one-shotters; (f) how 
coordination among one-shotters can provide some of the advantages of repeat 
players (for instance, through regional organizations); and (g) the relatively high level 
of engagement by industries and consumer groups compared to those with pro-poor 
concerns in lobbying for rules and shaping scientific discourse.  These factors are 
important determinants of the constraints and opportunities the current international 
rule-making system has for poor livestock producers and their advocates. 
Recommendations for making international rule-making friendlier to poor producers 
consider two perspectives.  From the perspective of poor producers and their 
advocates the primary routes to influencing international rule-making include: 
influencing their own country’s position in international organizations; lobbying those 
training country delegates to international organizations to include a focus on the 
relationship between food safety rules, poverty reduction, and the needs of poor 
livestock producers; establishing transnational alliances with other poor producers 
and/or NGOs; and contributing to the scientific understanding of food safety concerns 
in their unique contexts. 
Developing country governments, on the other hand, have more options for 
representing their own interests in international rule-making.  While their 
participation in international organizations is historically less than that of developed 
countries there are signs of improvement in recent years.  Important activities they 
can engage in include: greater coordination at the national level among ministries and 
individuals responsible for developing policy positions in all international food safety 
organizations; improving the quality and quantity of delegations to international 
organizations; forming alliances with other similarly-situated countries on issues of 
particular concern; and lobbying for technical assistance to comply with international 
standards and with a goal of complying with private international standards as well.  
In general, developing countries can do much more to address the interests of their 
poor producers.  
   
1 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Three important trends converged in the 1990s.  One was the ongoing “livestock 
revolution” that might do for livestock what the green revolution was supposed to 
accomplish for crops.  The second was the increasing international attention to food 
safety.  The last was the accelerating development of international economic law, 
including rules that govern food trade and the application of food safety measures.  
This paper considers the opportunities and constraints poor livestock producers face 
when confronting the latter two trends.  Specifically, how can international food 
safety rule-making be friendlier to the interests of poor livestock producers? 
Some herald a “livestock revolution” as an important route out of poverty.  One key 
trait of this revolution is the increasing global demand for livestock food products.  
Another is that growth in consumption and production of livestock food products in 
developing countries is outpacing that in developed countries (IFPRI 1999; FAOSTAT 
2002).
1   T h e  h o p e  i s  t h a t  p o o r  p r o d u c e r s  w i ll benefit from the increasing demand 
(Delgado, Rosegrant et al. 1999; ILRI 2000; CGIAR 2002; Upton 2004).
2 
At the same time, there is increasing awareness of the potential risks associated with 
livestock products.  The Mad Cow scare in Europe and avian influenza in East Asia are 
only two of many health concerns attracting public attention.  These problems are 
international because trade and travel enable contaminated food products to cross 
borders.
3  Indeed, trade in these products is increasing, with much of the increase 
coming from developing countries, although developed countries still dominate world 
markets (FAOSTAT 2002; FAO 2003b).
4    Importing countries have good reason to 
concern themselves with the food safety practices of exporting countries.  Long-term 
trends point to increasing imports for both developed and developing countries.   
Exporting countries also have corresponding reasons for concern.  A recent World Bank 
(2005) report suggests that there is a trend towards greater export blockages at 
borders.  The report cites several reasons for this including the “increased availability 
of agency resources and heightened concern for bio-security and for protection 
against prominent food safety threats.” 
Finally, international governance of food safety developed rapidly in the 1990s, 
accompanying trends in the general development of international economic law.  In 
the past, the Codex Alimentarius Commission (Codex) was the agency primarily 
responsible for the development of public international food safety rules, although the 
World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) created some rules relevant to livestock 
food product safety.  These rules took the form of voluntary standards—guidelines for 
state practice and recommendations for protecting human health.   
Since 1995 the World Trade Organization (WTO) has linked the international rules 
created through these organizations to its own rules regarding trade as defined by the 
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures. 
                                                 
1 The expected annual increase (1993 – 2003) in meat consumption is 0.6% for developed countries and 2.8% for developing 
countries.  The expected annual increase (1993 - 2003) in dairy consumption is 0.2% for developed countries and 3.3% for 
developing countries (IFPRI 1999).   
2 While there are many reasons to believe there will be continued growth in the livestock sector, some recent studies suggest 
that growth will slow (FAO 2003a).  
3 A recent report (Rocourt et al. 2003) suggests several reasons for the increase in reported food-borne disease incidence:  
new feeding practices (such as those that may have contributed to BSE), modern intensive animal husbandry practices, 
changes in agronomic practices (affecting fruits and vegetables), increase in international trade (rapid transfer of micro-
organisms from one country to another, increasing time between processing and consumption, and a population that is 
exposed to higher numbers of a greater variety of pathogens), changes in food technology, increase in susceptible 
populations (more old people), increase in travel, and changes in lifestyle and consumer demands. 
4 For instance, the annual export growth rate (%) for meat between 1980 and 1990 was 3.3% for developed countries but 5.4% 
for developing countries; between 1990 and 2001 it was 5.5% for developed countries and 8.5% for developing countries FAO 
(2003b). 1. Introduction 
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Especially important are provisions for a SPS Committee and links to the WTO’s 
enforcement mechanism (the Dispute Settlement Mechanism). This enforcement 
mechanism makes OIE and Codex rules suddenly appear less voluntary and more 
important.  
All of this raises two questions:  What is the relevance of international food safety law 
to poor producers seeking to use livestock as a way out of poverty?  And if any of 
these rules are relevant what can be done to ensure that the rule-making process 
considers poor producer interests?  The primary focus of this study is on this last 
question. 
A couple of caveats are worth mentioning before continuing.  First, food safety 
standards are not the only factor affecting poor livestock producer competitiveness, 
nor are they necessarily the most important.  Second, this paper focuses on one 
general strategy for addressing international food safety rules: influencing their 
development.  A recent World Bank (2005) paper points out that other strategies, such 
as changing to target markets with different standards, or passive compliance, are 
also possible.  Finally, there are some who argue that current international rule-
making is inherently unfair for developing countries and poor producers and therefore 
advocate drastic change in the rule-making system.  Instead, this paper takes the 
system as given, though some measures for reform are considered. 
The paper relies on a variety of information sources.  Research began with a review of 
the relevant secondary literature, including academic studies and legal commentary.  
A second source was relevant primary literature, including the texts of pertinent 
international agreements and meeting minutes.  Third, there were interviews with 
staff of a variety of international organizations, including:  the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), the World Animal Health Organization (OIE), the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and World 
Health Organization (WHO).  There also were interviews with country delegations to 
many of these organizations and interviews with academics and experts.  Finally, 
there was direct observation of meetings of the WTO’s Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
(SPS) Committee and Codex Committee on General Principles (CCGP) in October and 
November 2004. 
This paper is about strategies in international rule-making and the paper’s 
organization reflects this.  The next section of this paper outlines the types of 
international food safety rules that exist and discuses whether and how they might 
matter to poor livestock producers in developing countries.  Two sections then analyze 
the strategic setting states face.  Section Three describes and analyzes the 
international rule-making environment surrounding food safety with special attention 
to the central international organizations. Section Four completes the strategic 
setting by examining pertinent states, the agri-food industry, and other private actors.  
Section Five, drawing on the context provided by previous chapters, analyzes several 
instances of international rule-making with respect to food safety.  Finally, Section Six 
concludes and provides recommendations for those wishing to make international rule-
making friendlier to poor livestock producer interests.  
  
3 
2.  RULES THAT MATTER 
An objective of this study is to identify strategic entry points for those wishing to 
make international rule-making friendlier to poor producers of livestock products.   
Thus it is important to begin with an understanding of the nature of these rules and 
how such rule-making might matter to poor producers.   
Why Are There Rules? 
At the domestic level, the economic rationale for governments to create and enforce 
food safety rules is that food hazards are not easily detectable.  [Annex 1 lists some of 
the important food safety hazards associated with livestock products.]  Regulations 
are a market failure corrective for the incomplete information of producers and 
consumers.  However, other forces also influence rule-making.  Several food safety 
scares in the 1990s prompted consumers in Europe and elsewhere to pressure their 
government for new safety regulations and enforcement procedures.  More than a few 
states created new regulatory authorities as a result (OECD 2003).  New regulations 
tend to create new sets of winners and losers.  The associated threats and 
opportunities lead some interested parties to political action.   
States also create public international food safety rules for a variety of reasons.  The 
primary rationale is to address policy externalities.  A policy externality exists when 
one state’s policy affects another state (Abbott and Snidal 2001).  For instance, the 
European Union’s policy to ban all meat raised using growth hormones affected US 
beef exporters that relied on those hormones.  Similarly, from the EU perspective US 
policy to allow growth hormones represented a health threat to its consumers.   
Actions at both Codex and the WTO sought to address this issue.  However, as in the 
domestic context, some interested parties seek the creation or elimination of 
particular rules for interests other than the public good.  
Types of Rules 
Several distinctions can be made about the types of rules that may matter.  First is 
the distinction between primary and secondary rules (Hart 1972).  Primary rules 
involve the substantive obligations states face.  In the area of food safety, an example 
is Article 5 (1) of the SPS Agreement that requires members—“as appropriate to the 
circumstances”—to base their food safety measures on risk assessment.  International 
food safety standards—such as the guidelines issued by Codex—are also primary.   
Secondary rules, however, govern the processes for the creation, change and 
termination of primary rules.  These are akin to the “rules of the game” discussed in 
the new institutional economics.  An example is the WTO rule that decision-making 
should be primarily by consensus (Article IX, WTO Agreement). 
This distinction is not trivial.  It is commonly said that developing countries, due to 
their weak position in the international system are rule-takers.  These comments 
generally target the question of secondary rules.  However, it is interesting to note 
that developed country influence over such rules in the area of food safety is 
increasingly limited.  First, developed countries have relatively high stakes in 
maintaining the institutions; it would be costly for them opt out or try to create new 
institutions that would better serve their wishes.
5  Second, they now face developing 
                                                 
5 That is, to create or eliminate secondary rules. 2. Rules that Matter 
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countries that are increasingly attuned to efforts to change the rules of the game and 
even actively engage in efforts to make the rules friendlier to their own interests.
6 
However, much of this paper addresses primary rules, specifically food safety 
standards.  Table 1 shows the division of food safety standards into three general 
categories: import bans, technical specifications, and information requirements 
(Roberts, Josling and Orden 1999).  The primary focus in this study is on technical 
specifications and import bans intended to protect human health.  For example, the 
standard set by the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) calls for states to 
place only partial bans on beef imports from countries where bovine spongiform 
encephalitis (BSE) is found.  Total bans, though common in practice, are considered 
unnecessarily trade-restrictive. 
Table 1:  Classifications of SPS Standards. 

























































































































Source:  Roberts, Josling and Orden (1999) 
 
Today, guidelines are in place requiring that food safety standards be based on 
science using appropriate risk assessment procedures.  In certain respects, restriction 
to the use of scientific criteria narrows the scope for conflict between states 
regarding SPS measures.  Several insiders suggested that conflict is far more likely for 
other technical barriers to trade—such as labeling requirements—than they are for 
food safety.  However, as explained later in this section, several factors make the 
outcome of standards development unclear. 
A third important distinction is that food safety is not the same as food quality, 
although there might be overlap.  “Quality includes all product attributes that 
influence a product’s value to consumers” (Unnevehr and Hirschhorn 2000).  Safety 
includes all measures intended to protect human health.  In the WTO there is an 
effort to treat these issues separately: food safety issues are the realm of the SPS 
Agreement while a separate Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) considers 
quality concerns.  Nevertheless, some overlap is inevitable as safe products are 
valuable to consumers, and as processes involved in making a product safe can also 
                                                 
6 One African delegate to the Codex Alimentarius Commission told me that, although he may not have the technical expertise 
required to debate the scientific points of Codex standards, he is able to effectively argue for the construction of fair 
principles and procedures for guiding standard-setting. 2. Rules that Matter 
5 
affect other quality attributes.  Thailand, for example, has complained that the heat 
treatment Australia requires for ensuring the safety of imported poultry meat is not 
only expensive, but affects its quality (making it taste like paper). 
Finally, a fourth important distinction is between public and private rules.  Public 
international rules – those made by international organizations such as the WTO and 
the Codex Alimentarius Commission – are made by state governments.  Private 
international rules are made by firms or industry groups whose membership cross 
national boundaries and who are interested in standardizing business practice – for a 
variety of reasons – across countries.  The focus of this paper is on public international 
rules.  However, the issue of private international rules is important enough to merit a 
little more discussion. 
Private Rules 
Governments are not the only important rule-makers.  Increasingly, the standards set 
by private corporations and industry organizations act as the de facto standards 
producers must meet.
 7  Thus, even though a state may accept a product that meets 
international food safety standards, obeying its WTO obligations, purchasers of those 
products within the state may simply choose not to purchase these products, 
preferring products that meet higher (or different) standards.  There is no remedy in 
public international law for suppliers in such situations.
8   They must competitively 
meet those standards or accept that they will not be able to act as a supplier to those 
purchasers.
9  
The significance of private rules appears to be expanding (Henson and Hooker 2001; 
Reardon, Timmer et al. 2003).  Increasing vertical coordination throughout the agri-
food industry is taking power away from producers and placing it in the hands of 
distributors and retailers.  Simultaneously, increasing concentration within the retail 
industry is having similar affects.  WalMart, both the largest business in the world and 
the largest grocery retailer, is famous for its clout with suppliers.  The dispersed and 
relatively disorganized selling power of livestock producers is little match for the 
coordinated and concentrated buying power of such retailers.  Box 1 describes some 
of the important rule-making activities of retailers and their associations. 
There are a variety of reasons why private actors create safety standards, including 
(a) to fill in for missing public standards (Reardon, Codron et al. 2001; Reardon, 
Timmer et al. 2003); (b) to avoid legal claims that their products are unsafe (Henson 
and Hooker 2001); (c) to market more effectively, including product differentiation 
and reputation enhancement (Henson and Hooker 2001; Reardon, Codron et al. 2001; 
Reardon, Timmer et al. 2003); and (d) to facilitate management of an increasingly 
globalized food chain by harmonization.
10  Reardon et al. (2003) note that private rules 
                                                 
7 Biersteker and Hall (2002) suggest there may be two types of private authority:  “Institutional market authority refers to 
the capacity of private actors to set standards that are recognized and adhered to by others.  Normative private authority 
refers to the general acceptance of the more abstract idea that markets should determine decision-making over important 
issues.” 
8 There may be options in private arbitration. 
9 Some even wonder if private international food safety rules will eventually make public international rules irrelevant.  
While they may indeed reduce the significance of public rules, there will probably always be a place for public international 
rules so long as state leaders face constituent pressures (industry or consumer) to create food safety policies that ultimately 
affect trading partners, and so long as state preferences for policies vary. 
10 On this last point, Reardon et al. (2003) write:  “Moreover, as the geographic space of the procurement system of a given 
chain increases from zone to country to region to global, there exists the incentive and capacity to impose a standardization 
of private standards over suppliers in the various countries that are part of the procurement system. That is, to supply to the 
Central American Retail Holding Company operated by Ahold and two other regional chains in Central America, there is 
increasing convergence in the quality and eventually safety standards that will be necessary for a Nicaraguan just like a 
Guatemalan or Costa Rican supplier to meet to supply to the regional procurement system. In the same way, Brazilian melon 
suppliers supplying to the Carrefour system have to meet a single standard for the whole Carrefour system.” 2. Rules that Matter 
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may be implemented with or without third party certification, and sometimes in 
conjunction with public standards.  Further discussion of the activities of private 
actors seeking to influence public rules is provided in Section Four. 
Box 1:  Private Rule-Makers 
Retailers tend to play the lead role in developing these systems of 
private rules.  Lead actors and examples of activities relevant to 
livestock food products include the following: 
EurepGap, an initiative started in 1997 by the Euro-Retailer Produce 
Working Group.  They recently announced they are nearing the final 
stages of “plans to implement global Integrated Farm Assurance 
standards for meat products to promote safe and sustainable 
agriculture”. 
CIES, the Food Business Forum which represents 70% of food retail 
revenue internationally, also started a Global Food Safety Initiative 
aimed at establishing benchmarks for food safety standards.  Top 
retailers, including WalMart, Carrefour, and Ahold, are members. 
Carrefour’s (a food retail chain based in Europe, also present in Latin 
America and Asia) Quality Assurance certification includes measures for 
traceability, preserving the cold chain, elimination of pathogens and 
elimination of chemical contaminants. 
________________ 
Sources:  Carrefour (2001); Reardon, Timmer et al. (2003); and 
EurepGap (2004) 
 
Are the Rules Important to Poor Livestock Producers? 
Researchers are paying increasing attention to the impact of food safety standards on 
developing countries (Henson, Loader et al. 2000; Buzby 2003; OECD 2003; Wilson, 
Otsuki et al. 2003; World Bank 2005).  But there is little consideration of the specific 
impacts on poor producers within developing countries.
11  This is important because 
developing country government interests and poor producer interests are not 
necessarily the same.  Differences arise for many reasons, including: (1) lack of 
information among officials regarding poor producer interests, (2) government capture 
by larger producers who may or may not have different interests than poor 
smallholders, and (3) government capture by consumer interests which may naturally 
differ from producer interests.   Ethiopia provides a clear example of a case where 
poor livestock producer needs are not always considered by their government.  In the 
face of a ban on Ethiopian livestock due to Rift Valley Fever, the government at one 
point refused to acknowledge the existence of the disease (FEWSNET 2004). 
Standards Do Not Matter? 
What then are the concerns of poor livestock producers?  There are at least three 
reasons to think that these international rule-making activities are not important.   
                                                 
11 For an exception, see Hall and Ehui (2004). 2. Rules that Matter 
7 
!  Many do not produce for export.  Few livestock products produced by the poor 
are traded internationally.  Since international rules about food safety primarily 
concern trade, their impacts on non-exporting producers are only indirect.   
Indeed, most food is consumed in the country where it was produced.  In terms of 
milk, only approximately 10% of all world production is traded internationally 
(FAOSTAT). 
!  The standards may not be implemented.  Even when their own countries adopt 
international standards it is not necessarily the case that the standards will be 
implemented.  States frequently adopt Codex standards as their own standards, 
but are able to put in place the measures required to monitor domestic production 
and enforce those standards less frequently.  It may be even less likely that the 
state will intervene in cases where poor producers produce for their own 
consumption and not for the market. 
!  Standards are not a high priority for poor producers.  A survey by the 
International Federation of Agricultural Producers (IFAP) found that farmers 
thought many other factors—ranging from social and political stability to basic 
infrastructure—were more important for poverty reduction (IFAP 2000). 
But Sometimes Standards Do Matter… 
Nevertheless, there are several reasons why these rules may matter to poor 
producers.   
!  Governments may require compliance.  Poor producers may face new regulations 
or new enforcement regimes.  Researchers increasingly find that efforts to 
harmonize international food safety standards are causing countries to raise their 
standards (Post 2004, Vogel 1995).  If their country adopts the international 
standard there is the chance poor producers will be forced to comply.  This may 
be because the benefits associated with compliance only exist if all producers 
comply.  If a large poultry producer wants to export, for instance, it can matter 
whether the country as a whole can be considered free of avian influenza. 
!  A desire to export.  Some poor producers do create products for export.  SPS 
measures can impact such trade by (a) imposing an import ban, (b) raising costs of 
production, distribution, and marketing, (c) diverting trade from one trading 
partner to another by discriminating across supplies, and (d) reducing overall 
trade flows through increasing costs (Unnevehr and Hirschhorn 2000).  In India, 
poor dairy producers participate in dairy collectives which export some of their 
products.  Moves to focus on traceability and process standards mean that even 
the practices of those poor producers may matter for international trade, even if 
intermediaries can account for the end product’s safety.  This can affect poor 
producers exporting to developing or middle-income countries as well as to 
developed countries.
12   
!  Innovation effects.  International standards might discourage countries from 
developing their livestock sector to include the production of processed goods 
(due to the higher standards placed on such goods).  The existence of some 
tougher standards has been likened to the problem of tariff escalation that 
countries already face for processed food products.  Innovation effects need not 
be negative, however.  Attempts to meet higher standards could provide a positive 
force for innovation. 
!  Market effects.  If a big producer within a country is denied the ability to export 
the producer may be forced to sell the product on the domestic market, lowering 
the domestic price for the good and the price poor producers can receive for their 
excess production. 
                                                 
12 However, it should be noted that SPS measures are only one factor among many affecting export potential. 2. Rules that Matter 
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!  Unintentional consequences of adopting inappropriate rules.  Some standards 
that countries adopt and implement may be inappropriate for the geographic and 
climactic conditions of the country.  Such conditions can impact the behavior of 
pathogens and the utility of procedures used to address them. A standard’s 
appropriateness also varies with population characteristics.
 13 
When Standards Help 
Many of the above points suggest standards are bad for poor producers, but not all the 
consequences are negative.  Already mentioned is the fact that innovation effects can 
be positive or negative.  Several benefits also accrue when international standard-
setting produces standards that can be usefully adopted by developing countries and 
which are appropriate to their geographical, climatic, and technological conditions. 
First, both poor producers and poor consumers benefit from a safer food supply.   
Second, when food safety measures promote animal health, producers can benefit.  
McLeod and Leslie (2001) provide a good overview of the costs and benefits of 
achieving disease free status.  An obvious benefit is higher production, as fewer 
animals are lost to disease.  Gil and Samartino (2001) estimate that the presence of 
tuberculosis in nine Latin American countries results in lost production of more than 
128,000 MT of milk and more than 32,000 MT of beef.  Less disease also means easier 
work for the poor producers and their families, boosting productivity.
14    
Animal disease is a major problem in developing countries. International rules that 
help a country create domestic policy to combat avian influenza (for example) not 
only aids the export potential of that country but also can increase poultry production 
for individual consumption (as fewer birds die) and act as a public health measure 
(boosting overall human productivity).  With appropriate technical assistance, poor 
producers in most cases benefit from a stricter domestic food safety regime.  Indeed, 
poor producers can be hurt by the lack of rules—which can serve as useful guidelines—
relevant to their needs. 
Science in International Rule-Making 
While science guides most standard-setting, it does not always.  Several factors make 
the outcome of standards development unclear and increase the likelihood that non-
scientific reasons will matter: 
!  The science is not always known (for example, in the case of genetically modified 
foods).
15 
!  The science may be context-specific and not all the necessary context-specific 
evidence may be known.  For instance, some populations are more susceptible to 
different food safety hazards, based on consumption patterns and other 
characteristics.  
                                                 
13 Examples of inappropriate application of standards meant for developed countries but adopted by developing countries 
include: (a) the 1990s decision to not chlorinate water in Peru, due to potential cancer risks, led to a cholera outbreak (cited 
in Unnevehr and Hirschhorn 2000); (b) Abeiderrahmane (2002) writes about how standard protective clothing worn by 
Northern dairy workers is inappropriate to Mauritania; and (c) Bastianelli and Le Bas (2002) note that less structured supply 
chains—as found in developing countries—make it difficult to “prevent contamination via inappropriate additives”. 
14 Animal disease is viewed by many to be a major constraint on small producers.  See, for example, Gning (2004). 
15 There is debate about the role of a precautionary principle in this area of international law.  The precautionary principle 
has its origins in the development of international environmental law.  However, debates over food safety standards for 
hormone-treated beef and genetically modified foods also focus on the applicability of this principle. The idea is that states 
should be allowed to ban or partially ban the import of some foods based on the goal of minimizing the perceived risks of 
new food technologies, even in cases of scientific uncertainty.  The EU has especially argued that the precautionary principle 
should apply to food safety standards, some even arguing it is now a principle of customary international law.  The US and 
others argue that the precautionary principle undermines the scientific justification that current agreements require for 
regulating food imports. 2. Rules that Matter 
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!  If there is a trade-related dispute over standards and it goes to the WTO’s dispute 
settlement body, it will not be resolved by science experts.
16 
!  Guidelines on risk analysis can be ambiguous.  A real question exists as to whether 
the same level of risks should be applied to all situations by international 
standard-setting organizations.
17 
The fact that the science may not always be clear leaves the door open for other 
factors to influence international rule-making.  
The Importance of International Rule-Making 
It may not be fully known how much international food safety rules impact poor 
producers, and under which circumstances those effects are positive or negative.   
However, there are good reasons to believe that these rules will matter for at least 
some poor producers.  In such situations, it makes sense to be concerned with how 
international food safety rules are made.  Therefore, if it is established that poor 
producers are affected by international food safety rules, how might they influence 
those rules and their enforcement?  The answer to this question is the subject of the 
rest of this paper. 
 
                                                 
16 Several sources are useful on this point, including Guzman (2004) and Stewart (1999). 
17 For instance, sometimes a risk of 2 deaths per billion is considered high (the early EU position on the threat posed by 
aflatoxin), other times it seems it is not.  
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3.  THE INTERNATIONAL RULE-MAKING ENVIRONMENT 
The WTO, Codex, and OIE are central to livestock food safety rule-making.  This 
section describes and analyzes the rule-making environment these organizations 
create, individually and collectively.  It also considers briefly the roles played by other 
organizations. 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) 
The original 1949 General Agreement on Tarriffs and Trade (GATT) – the precursor to 
the WTO – contained two principles limiting food safety standard-setting by member 
states.  The principle of non-discrimination, embodied by the most-favored nation 
clause of Article I, required non-discriminatory treatment of products from foreign 
suppliers.  That is to say, one could not have different standards for different foreign 
suppliers.
  The principle of national treatment,
18 embodied in Article III, required that 
foreign products not be treated differently from domestic ones.  A state should not 
have stricter rules for foreign products than they have for domestic products (Griffin 
2000).  
In many respects the above principles were too general to have much applicability to 
questions of food safety standards used as trade barriers.  The first strong attempt to 
incorporate food standards into international trade law was made during the Tokyo 
Round of GATT negotiations, which concluded in 1979.   That round produced a 
Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement (TBT)
19 which, while not specifically addressing 
the issue of food safety, did address some food safety-related concerns.  In particular, 
governments were asked to make their regulatory systems more transparent by 
notifying other governments when their technical regulations were not based on 
international standards.  The 1979 agreement also contained provisions for dispute 
resolution that were separate, and more robust, than the rest of the GATT system at 
the time.  However, this was a plurilateral agreement, signed by only 32 GATT 
members.  In practice its effects were limited (Griffin 2000). 
In 1985, countries met in Punta del Este, Uruguay, to discuss a new round of GATT 
negotiations.  In these negotiations agriculture and food (including food safety) were 
central concerns.  Tariff barriers were already in decline (they declined an average of 
37% between 1970 and 1996)
20, and an objective of the Uruguay Round was their 
continued reduction or even elimination.  Meanwhile, declines in tariffs heightened 
the visibility of sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures as barriers to trade.  And 
these barriers are very real.  Today, for instance, world trade in beef and pork is 
largely defined by whether countries are considered free of foot and mouth disease or 
not (Dyck and Nelson 2003).  States were concerned that SPS measures would be used 
as a new form of protectionism.  An Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary  Measures (SPS Agreement) was seen as a logical complement to an 
Agreement on Agriculture. 
Examples of Relevant Rules 
The WTO does not set standards nor does the SPS Agreement require members to 
adopt particular SPS measures.  However, the WTO does create rules that matter for 
                                                 
18 Not originally called a principle, but subsequently known as one.
 
19 Note that the Tokyo Round TBT Agreement is significantly different from the Uruguay Round’s TBT and SPS Agreements. 
20 Henson and Loader (2000). 3. The International Rule-making Environment 
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food safety, and the SPS Agreement revolutionized international food safety 
governance.  Box 2 summarizes its key features.
21 
Box 2:  Key features of the SPS Agreement 
Perhaps the most important feature of the agreement is that it requires 
states to justify any standards higher than current international 
standards.  Specifically, science-based Risk Assessment (Articles 2.2 & 
5)  should guide standard-setting.  WTO members are required to 
consider “available scientific evidence; relevant processes and 
production methods; relevant inspection, sampling and testing 
methods; prevalence of specific diseases or pests; existence of pest- or 
disease-free areas; relevant ecological and environmental conditions; 
and quarantine or other treatment.”  The agreement also allows 
technical and economic considerations to play a role. 
Other key features: 
Harmonization (Article 3).  Countries are encouraged to participate in 
international standard-setting organizations and base their own 
measures on those standards.  Three organizations are mentioned by 
name:  Codex for the protection of human health, OIE for the 
protection of animal health, and the newly created International Plant 
Protection Convention (IPPC) for the protection of plant health. 
Equivalence (Article 4).  Countries are required to accept other 
countries’ SPS measures provided that they can be demonstrated to 
provide equivalent levels of protection. 
Transparency (Article 7).  States are required to publish and notify the 
WTO of all proposed and implemented measures and establish enquiry 
points for trading partners that have questions. 
Regionalization (Article 6).  The Agreement requires states to ensure 
their SPS measures are adapted to the relevant regional conditions and 
that they allow products from pest- or disease-free areas in other 
states. 
Dispute Mechanism (Article 11; GATT 1994 Articles XXII & XXIII).  
States should make use of the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism 
when disputes that cannot be solved bilaterally arise.  Dispute panels 
should seek the advice of experts, in consultation with parties to the 
dispute, and may consult the relevant international organization. 
 
Charnovitz (1994) argues that this Agreement replaces the previous GATT principle of 
national treatment with that of international treatment.  While under national 
treatment a state is asked to apply its own domestic standards to an imported 
product, under international treatment a state is asked to apply an international 
standard to the imported product.  Country standards can only be stricter than those 
already accepted by relevant international standard-setting organizations if they can 
be scientifically justified.  Many consumer groups criticize the Agreement, arguing 
that it is leading to a lowering of country standards.  However, some research suggests 
                                                 
21 An excellent source for (especially legal) analysis of the SPS Agreement is the WTO Analytical Index, available on their 
website (http://www.wto.org ). 3. The International Rule-making Environment 
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the overall trend is towards a raising, rather than a lowering of standards (Vogel 1995; 
Post 2003).
22 
The Agreement also placed several obligations on those who trade with developing 
countries, including that they should take into account developing country needs when 
creating standards and allow for longer periods of compliance by developing 
countries. At a more general level developing countries are able to receive time-
limited exemptions to rules by a SPS Committee (within the WTO) and other countries 
should support their participation in relevant international organizations and help 
provide technical assistance for compliance with SPS measures. 
Decision-Making at the WTO 
There are several levels of decision-making at the WTO.  The top decision-making 
body is the Ministerial Conference, meeting every two years with the authority to 
make decisions for all the WTO’s multilateral trade agreements.  On a more regular 
basis the General Council meets and makes decisions on behalf of the Ministerial 
Conference.  It is composed of representatives from all Member countries.  Next in the 
hierarchy are the Councils for Trade in Goods, Trade in Services, and Trade-Related 
Intellectual Property Rights, as well as a variety of Committees and Working Groups.  
The SPS Committee sits under the Council for Trade in Goods. 
The SPS Committee deliberates on general rules about food safety and trade, such as 
the procedures for establishing equivalence or the conditions under which 
regionalization occurs.  At a more specific level, activities involve constant 
interpretation and re-interpretation of specific standards as well as negotiations over 
measures where international standards are not yet set.  At this level, livestock food 
products are an important part of SPS Committee business.  Through the end of 2003, 
approximately forty percent of the trade concerns raised at committee meetings 
involved livestock food products.
23  That number is higher if concerns related to animal 
feed, pet food, honey, and live animals are included (WTO GEN/SPS/204).   
Such trade concerns are increasingly raised by developing countries themselves.
24  
Developing country members have raised 101 trade concerns at the SPS Committee 
(including 2 from LDCs), compared to 143 raised by developed county members 
(through 2004).  Developing country measures were the target of 99 trade concerns 
compared with 124 developed country measures.  While the number of developing 
countries raising concerns is increasing, they are still a small number (less than 25) 
relative to the number of developing country WTO members. 
It is easy to find criticisms of WTO decision-making.  Some criticize the WTO for its 
ties to business.  That businesses are involved is logical; firms are the “major users of 
the trading system” (Hoekman and Kostecki 2001).  However, many feel that the 
                                                 
22 Victor (2000) suggests an interesting way the SPS Agreement could be used to raise standards:  “Lax standards, even if 
applied equally to local and imported products, could favour local producers and harm imports that are produced according 
to more expensive standards that prevail in the rest of the world market.  Using this argument, an alliance of global 
exporters and environmentalists may discover that the SPS Agreement is a very powerful tool—it could pry open local markets 
that are “distorted” by weak SPS standards and force a higher level of SPS protection.”  That is to say, the Agreement could 
be used to force countries to raise some standards.  Raised standards may then privilege imports from outside producers that 
already meet such standards and disadvantage domestic producers that do not. 
23 The WTO SPS Secretariat figures suggest that fewer trade concerns deal with food safety.  However, their figures exclude 
BSE and avian influenza-related cases where meat and dairy imports were concerned, which I include in my own measure.  
Their own figures (updated through 2004) are that for all trade concerns 40% dealt with animal health and zoonoses, 27% 
with food safety, 29% with plant health and 4% with other concerns.  Considering only trade concerns related to animal 
health and zoonoses, 40% dealt with TSEs, 25% with FMD and 35% with other animal health concerns. 
24 More trade concerns were raised by developing countries in the past five years than were raised in the WTO’s first five 
years.  Developing countries raised only 2 concerns in the first 2 years of the SPS Agreement, while developed countries 
raised 11. 3. The International Rule-making Environment 
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importance of trade rules mean that interests other than industry need to be 
represented.   
WTO decision-making usually operates by consensus but many question the nature of 
that consensus.  Steinberg (2002) argues that the GATT and WTO Agreements 
themselves, while created through a consensus-based process, were actually the 
result of power-based politics.  A core insight is that consensus merely requires that 
other states stay silent.  In some cases, this may be easier to achieve than it is to get 
states to make actual positive votes.  In the day-to-day decision-making activities of 
the WTO, one must also consider the breadth of the consensus when many states are 
not present at meetings and it is normal practice to make decisions without even 
determining who is present. 
Many question the fairness of WTO governance vis-à-vis the participation of 
developing countries.  Their arguments typically focus on one of three causes for the 
perceived inability of developing states (and especially LDCs) to wield influence: (a) 
these states do not participate most likely because they lack the capacity
25; (b) the 
rules and institutions are biased
26; (c) powerful countries are behaving unfairly.
27 
This is changing in several ways.  One, China’s accession to the WTO creates a new set 
of bargaining dynamics.  The importance of this was clear at the Cancun Ministerial 
Meeting when China’s joining the G-21 group of states added extra clout.  Two, 
alliances among developing countries are increasingly important.  Three, all countries 
are learning.  In the area of SPS there are several visible manifestations of learning.  
First, states are more careful now to bring only strong complaints to the Committee.  
Second, increasing numbers of developing countries are learning how to protect 
themselves from unfair SPS measures.  Third, developing countries are increasingly 
bringing their own complaints forward to the committee.  
Nevertheless, there is still room for improvement.  Developing country attendance at 
the SPS Committee displays no clear positive trend.  Moreover, developing country 
delegations are typically small whereas developed country delegations can include 
teams of specialists.   
The WTO’s Unique Role in Dispute Settlement 
An important way international rules develop and become clarified is through the 
settlement of disputes.  Dispute settlement at the WTO may best be viewed as a 
pyramid (see Figure 1 below).  All evidence suggests that most SPS-related disputes 
between trading partners are settled before being brought to the WTO.  If not settled 
at that point, then a next step countries can take is to raise the trade concern at one 
of the meetings of the SPS Committee.  This is not a step that countries take lightly as 
it may be difficult to know its effect on the dispute outcome.  This action partly acts 
as a public shaming mechanism, but it also has the potential to reveal to other 
interested third parties the nature of the dispute.
28 
                                                 
25 See Oyejide (2000); Michalapolous (1998); Blackhurst et al. (1999); Jawara and Kwa (2003). 
26 See Blachurst et al. (1999); Jawara and Kwa (2003). 
27 See especially  Jawara and Kwa (2003). 
28 This deserves a little further explanation.  It could be the case that other states have not paid attention to the fact that 
one Member State is placing challengeable SPS-related restrictions on imports.  A public dispute means that a defaulting 
state (the state with the challengeable regulations) may be left open to complaints from these other states. 3. The International Rule-making Environment 
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The final step is to resort to use of the WTO’s dispute settlement system.  Use of this 
mechanism is costly and thus the decision to go this step is rarely taken.
29  Of the 
more than 330 disputes brought to the dispute settlement system (through April 2005) 
approximately 30 were alleged violations of the SPS Agreement.  Eight of these cases 
involved livestock food products and only two of those involved the establishment of a 
dispute settlement panel for actual arbitration (see Annex 2). In this last step, if the 
Dispute Settlement Board (DSB) decides for a claimant, there are three levels of 
enforcement. First, the WTO asks the injuring party—the defaulting state—to conform 
to whatever original agreements it had with the injured state.  If that does not occur, 
then the WTO asks the defaulting state to pay compensation.  If that does not occur, 
then the WTO authorizes the injured state—the prevailing party to the dispute—to use 
countermeasures, to retaliate.
30  The weakness of this process is that it is entirely 
bilateral (Pauwelyn 2000). If a state is weak, it is unlikely it will be able to retaliate; 
it probably does not have the necessary leverage.  If the winning state is unable to 
retaliate, there is little incentive for any defaulting state to abide by any DSB 
decisions. Nevertheless, it is this law-settling and law-enforcing role that makes the 
WTO central to today’s food safety governance. 








The Codex Alimentarius Commission (Codex) 
Both the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Health Organization 
(WHO) have independent mandates to address food safety concerns and they began 
collaborating as early as 1950.  Since 1963 they conduct these efforts through their 
joint oversight of the Codex Alimentarius Commission.
31   
                                                 
29 A few additional comments are worth making here.  First, legal assistance is available to developing countries.  Article 
27.2 of the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding requires that the WTO Secretariat provide a qualified legal expert to 
developing countries on request.  Also, an independent Advisory Centre on WTO Law (in Geneva) was established by a group 
of WTO members.  Second, there is no evidence of negative bias towards developing countries in developed countriy use of 
the dispute settlement mechanism.  Good analysis of the use of this mechanism is provided by Romano (2002a, b).  A recent 
paper by Brown and Hoekman (2005) discusses the roles litigation costs play. 
30 Annex 2: Dispute Settlement Mechanism, WTO AGREEMENT, Article 22. 
31 The Codex Alimentarius Commission’s roots are European.  Perhaps its first life was as the Austro-Hungarian Empire’s 
Codex Alimentarius Austriacas, created between 1897 and 1911.  In the 1950s Austria helped establish a Codex Alimentarius 
Europaeus.  That Codex’ Council eventually adopted a resolution in 1961 that its work be handed over to FAO and WHO 
(FAO/WHO 1999).  
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Examples of Relevant Rules 
Codex is the primary international food safety standard-setting organization, and it 
produces a broad range of food standards.  Those most relevant to livestock food 
product safety include: (a) standards relating to the maximum levels of pesticide 
residues, contaminants, and additives that can be found in foods and (b) guidelines on 
processes and procedures, such as the Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP) 
system (Annex 3).  Other work Codex does involves labeling standards, commodity 
standards (defining what a product is or how it is made), and quality descriptors 
(FAO/WHO 2002). 
There is evidence that Codex work increasingly favors process standards such as 
HACCP.  This reflects changes in the market environment, specifically increased 
vertical integration and fewer open market transactions.  A risk assessment approach, 
as prescribed by the WTO, is also very compatible with process-based standards. In 
turn, developing countries increasingly adopt their own HACCP-based measures.
32 
Decision-Making 
Final decisions about food standards are made by the Commission which now meets 
every year.
33  Acceptance of a standard requires a majority vote.  Annex 4 describes 
the eight step process that leads to the creation of a new standard (the annex also 
suggests actions Codex members and observers can take at each step).  
The Commission’s work is regularly informed by the work of more than 30 Committees 
and by the work of expert committees and consultations, all supported by a small 
Secretariat of six professionals.  The most important meetings are those of the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission, the Codex Executive Committee, and the General Principles 
Committee.  At the lower levels the work of the Food Hygiene Committee, Food 
Additives and Contaminants Committee, Residues of Veterinary Drugs in Foods 
Committee, and Ad Hoc Task Force on Animal Feeding are all important to 
determining relevant food safety standards for animal products. 
Developing countries have a difficult time participating in all the deliberations of 
Codex committees.  Most do come to the annual meeting of the Commission but by 
the time a standard reaches its final stage in the approval process at the Commission, 
other countries are unlikely to be willing to revisit the issue.  The (generally 
unintentional) effect of this is that a small number of well-resourced countries 
dominate the rule-making process (Post 2004).  Many Codex participants interviewed 
for this study expressed their frustration that a rule could pass through so many steps 
only to be denied at the final stage because it is still a “new” item to one of the 
member countries. 
In the early 1990s, Codex faced intense criticism from advocacy groups (particularly 
consumer interest groups) who argued that the agency was captured by business 
interests that did not have the public good in mind.  Many industry ties to Codex are 
long-standing.  Braithwaite and Drahos (2000) suggest that it was, in fact, US industry 
that was the most important financier of Codex at the beginning.  Concerns about 
industry influence continue today.  A recent review of Codex found that consumer 
representatives thought they had too little influence and industry interests too much 
                                                 
32 However, it was also clear during interviews with WTO delegates that some developing country members thought of HACCP 
rules as simply another protectionist tool.   
One interesting twist:  When the Philippines tried to put in place a measure requiring imported meat products to be 
produced in HACCP compliant plants, Canada and other states blocked the measure, noting that Philippines did not require 
the same standards for its own plants. 
33 This is a recent change.  In the past Codex met on a biennial basis. 3. The International Rule-making Environment 
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influence.  Industry representatives thought the exact opposite was true.   
Governments tended to think that both groups had “appropriate” levels of influence 
(FAO/WHO 2002).
34   Section Four of this paper discusses more of these industry 
relations. 
The SPS Agreement was probably the most significant event in the life of Codex.  The 
associated legal recognition has added to its relevance and importance, but made 
compromise more difficult (FAO/WHO 2002).  Indeed, some observers suggest that 
signs of increased conflict in Codex standard-setting occurred almost immediately 
(Stewart and Johanson 1998). 
The World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) 
In the 1920s, threat of the cattle plague in Belgium—contracted via the port of 
Antwerp—prompted European countries to create the Office International des 
Epizooties (OIE).
35   From the beginning, the organization highlighted ties between 
trade and the spread of animal disease. 
Relevant Rules 
As early as 1960 the OIE had an agreement with the WHO, acknowledging some 
linkages between animal and human health.  It was only after prominent food safety 
scares in the 1990s and the adoption of the SPS Agreement, that the OIE began an 
organized response to food safety concerns.  In 2002 the OIE created a permanent 
Working Group on Animal Production Food Safety, which includes a member from the 
Codex Secretariat.  It also adopted a resolution clarifying its food safety mandate to 
“reduce food-borne risks to human health due to hazards arising from animals, in 
collaboration with appropriate international agencies” (FAO/WHO 2002).
36  In 2004 it 
revised its agreements with both the WHO and the FAO, placing greater emphasis on 
its role in creating standards relevant to food safety and the complementarity of its 
activities with that of Codex. 
OIE’s mandate overlaps with that of Codex in some significant respects.  First, there 
are “economies of scope” in designing public systems to address risks in animal and 
health safety.  Recently, for example, it has become popular to advocate a “farm to 
fork” approach to human food safety concerns.  Second, some pathogens affect both 
animal and human health.  Zoonoses are an obvious area where OIE and Codex 
interests overlap.  OIE’s Terrestial Code provisions on bovine brucellosis and 
tuberculosis are of direct interst to the Codex (OIE 2003)  Finally, animal production 
can involve exposure of animals to contaminants—including veterinary drug residues—
that may remain in animal products meant for human consumption. 
Decision-Making 
In the past and today, country delegates to the OIE are primarily veterinarians.  Rule-
making primarily takes place at the annual International Committee meeting where 
work is informed by the work of a number of committees that meet throughout the 
year, supported by a small Paris-based Secretariat.  The OIE General Rules (Chapter 1) 
                                                 
34 However, a slightly higher percentage of low- and middle-income states thought industry representatives had been granted 
too much influence than did high-income states. 
35 There were reasons for concern.  In the eighteenth century cattle plague – also called rinderpest – killed an estimated 200 
million cattle.  The impact of an 1860s Great Britain outbreak was akin to the impact of Mad Cow Disease today (Fisher 
1998).  In the Belgian case, rinderpest arrived when zebus arrived on their way from India to Brazil via Antwerp. 
36 OIE Resolution n. XV, 70 GS/FR Paris, May 2002 3. The International Rule-making Environment 
17 
stipulate that a simple majority is all that is required for most decisions, and each 
country has one vote.  In practice, this may be accomplished with a show of hands or 
(as was often the case in the past) by consensus.  With respect to livestock food 
products, two sets of OIE standards are especially relevant:  The International Animal 
Health Code and The Manual of Standards for Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines.   
Some consider the OIE to be the least democratic of the organizations reviewed so far.  
There are probably two reasons for this: (1) the historical lack of participation by 
nongovernmental organizations outside of industry, and (2) the general lack of 
transparency in the decision-making process.  The decision-making process also allows 
relatively few opportunities for both delegates and non-delegates to provide input.  
Some insiders suggest this really privileges the delegate who comes prepared to the 
annual meetings.  However, insiders also suggest that this lack of transparency 
actually makes the organization more efficient.  It typically takes the OIE two years to 
develop a standard, compared with Codex’ eight years. 
There are a number of signs that the OIE is trying to be more democratic and increase 
the participation of its developing country members.  It has been a long practice of 
the organization to provide funding for attendance to the International Committee 
meeting.  Now, through a Standards and Trade Development Facility (STDF)—co-
sponsored by the World Bank, WTO, FAO, and WHO—more efforts are being made to 
train developing country delegates to the OIE.  Still, some of the structural limits to 
the decision-making process persist. 
The OIE has its own dispute settlement mechanism, which is described by David Wilson 
and Alex Thiermann of the OIE: 
“This is a science-based approach to finding alternative solutions and resolving 
differences, as distinct from the legalistic approach used in the formal WTO 
system. The role of the OIE is to assist the parties to arrive at a scientifically 
sound conclusion, which is often different from those previously offered by the 
individual parties.” 
States have used the OIE’s good offices on at least two occasions, both in recent 
years.  The details are kept confidential.  Insiders say that in these early cases most of 
the costs of the process were borne by the OIE, making it especially attractive to 
developing countries and much more affordable than the WTO’s process. However, 
states may be asked to share more of the costs in the future and the means for 
enforcing any outcome are far less. 
Other Relevant International and Regional Organizations 
Most discussions of international food safety rules leave out the activities of several 
important international and regional organizations.  While their involvement in 
creating the international environment for food safety governance is less than the 
above organizations, they do fill important niches.  Box 3 lists some international and 
regional organizations and institutions that are part of the international food safety 
rule-making environment.  The activities of the International Organization for 
Standardization and the World Health Organization deserve special attention, 
however. 3. The International Rule-making Environment 
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Box 3:  Other significant international and regional organizations 
OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: 
The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) is relevant to food safety 
as biotechnology increases its impact on the agri-food sector.   
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
is active in the area of bio-safety and has recently undertaken studies 
to establish guidelines on the “normal” characteristics of animal feed, 
to be used as reference points for GM feed.     
The International Dairy Federation (IDF) established standards and 
guidelines for the dairy industry in the 1950s, prior to the formation of 
C od e x.   T od a y  it  r e g u l a r l y  p r ov i d e s e xp e r t  a d v i ce  t o C od e x o n  d a ir y  
regulations (and much of that advice is followed). 
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) provides guidelines on 
the irradiation of food, a process used by some countries to eliminate 
pathogens.   
REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: 
Efforts at regional integration in trade have the potential to increase 
the importance of regional organizations for developing international 
food safety rules.  Regional trade groups such as Mercado Común del 
Sur (MERCOSUR), Asian Pacific Economic Community (APEC), and South 
African Development Community (SADC) often deal with food safety 
governance at the regional level.  Some other regional organizations 
that have been important: 
The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) began 
developing food commodity standards in the 1950s.  Most of these are 
now subsumed by the work of Codex.  However, UNECE continues to do 
work in the area of quality standards.  There has been concern about 
duplication of work between the two organizations, especially in the 
area of fresh fruits and vegetables.  UNECE does create quality 
standards for meat. 
The European Food Safety Authority is the standard-setting body for 
the EU.  
The African Regional Standardization Organization (ARSO) has a 
technical committee for establishing standards in “Agriculture and Food 
Products”.  The organization has expressed recent interest in links 
between standards development and trade.
37 
PAHO (Pan-American Health Organization) is especially active in 
surveillance and information provision with respect to food safety.   
Through  Reunión Interamericana, a Nivel Ministerial, en Salud y 
Agricultura (RIMSA), Ministers of Agriculture and Health from PAHO 
Member States coordinate on veterinary public health. 
 
 
                                                 
37 See article at < http://www.unido.org/en/doc/21905 >. 3. The International Rule-making Environment 
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The membership of the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) is the 
standards institutes of countries.  Not all these standards institutes represent the 
governments, making the ISO a non-governmental organization. The ISO mandate is to 
establish technical standards in all fields.  Coordination with Codex does take place.  
Generally speaking, Codex can be said to supply the standards whereas the ISO 
supplies the sampling, testing, and analytical methods used to implement Codex 
standards.  ISO representatives are invited to Codex (and SPS Committee meetings); 
Codex is invited to attend meetings of ISO’s body involved in agricultural food product 
standards, Technical Committee 34. 
There are some who criticize the ISO.  The level of developing country participation is 
relatively low.  Some also express concerns about the level of industry involvement in 
ISO decision-making.  They think it should have a more governmental perspective and 
are worried that the standards set will be too high, too trade-restrictive.  One Codex 
insider told me there have been a couple cases of tension between ISO and Codex.  
For instance, several years ago both Codex and the ISO began work on traceability.
38  
There was concern of overlap in their work.  After discussions, ISO apparently 
accepted a background role on the issue, but some were concerned that ISO could 
grab the initiative on such issues away from Codex.
39 
The World Health Organization (WHO) is a parent of Codex but it may soon have an 
independent effect on food safety governance.  Through its own World Health 
Assembly it has the capacity to produce regulations binding on its members.   
Currently, it is in the process of revising its International Health Regulations (IHR).  
Originally created in 1969, the regulations currently only address yellow fever, 
cholera, and the plague (WHO 2005).  They require states to notify the international 
community within 24 hours of the presence of any of these diseases and include a 
series of measures to control their spread to other countries.  The legal apparatus is 
sophisticated enough to include a dispute resolution mechanism, which is being 
revised.  The new IHR will have a much expanded scope.   It may require states to 
notify all other states of any public health event of international concern.  One can 
easily imagine the applicability of recent cases such as avian influenza and BSE.  A 
draft document provides WHO with the ability to ask states to restrict travel and trade 
to prevent the spread of diseases, but also requires WHO to minimize interference 
with international traffic.  While these are potentially the most trade restrictive 
measures, there is no evidence at this point that such rules will be used to 
discriminate against developing countries or poor producers (WHO 1999; WHO 2004).
40     
                                                 
38 This is the ability to trace a product through its life cycle.  For dairy products this can include everything from the animal 
feed that fed the dairy cows, to the places and practices of raising the cow, to the processing of the milk and its delivery to 
the consumer. 
39  Another insider told me this problem was partly solved by Nestle.  A key person on the ISO committee working on 
traceability was also associated with Nestle.  Nestle apparently acted to rein in this ISO committeeperson.  I was told that 
Nestle acted this way because it favors Codex as a safety standard-setting body.   
40 One could see, however, that a health hazard such as avian influenza could reach the status of international concern.  
Avian influenza already is having a negative effect on Asian poultry production. 3. The International Rule-making Environment 
20 
Figure 2:  Evolution of the Food Safety Regime Complex 
















1881.  the 
Phylloxera vasatrix 
Convention











































1963.  Codex 
Alimentarius 
Commission created.
1949.  GATT 
enters into 
force
1924.  OIE 
created.
1897-1911.  The 
Austro-Hungarian 
Empire creates the 
Codex Alimentarius 
Austriacas  
1951.  IPPC created. 

















1950s.  UNECE 
creates standards 





































       Organization3. The International Rule-making Environment 
21 
Relationships among the International Organizations (IOs) 
While IOs do cooperate, there are contested areas of governance in the case of food 
safety.  Conflict among IOs is not the norm, but it does occur.  Understanding the 
relationships among these organizations is necessary for those wishing to influence the 
development of international food safety law.  The impact of the SPS Agreement 
illustrates the importance of these relationships.  This sub-section also discusses the 
relevance of differences between the UN and WTO systems, and the importance of 
these inter-organizational relationships for country strategies.  First, it is useful to 
summarize the nature of what can be called the food safety regime complex. 
The livestock food safety regime complex is a legal environment unique in the way it 
constrains and enables states’ actions.  Kal Raustiala and David G. Victor
 (2003) coined 
the term regime complex and define it as “an array of partially overlapping 
institutions governing a particular issue area, among which there is no agreed upon 
hierarchy.” Figure 2 is an illustration of the evolution of international organizations 
relevant to food safety and their relationships to each other. 
Figure 2 also displays graphically how governance in this area changed over time in 
several ways.  First, the scope of governance is increasing.  Gaps in international 
standard-setting, while they persist, are diminishing.  Second, there have been shifts 
in authority over standard-setting during this evolution.  The International Dairy 
Federation in its early years played an important role in setting international dairy 
standards.  Since the establishment of Codex, however, it has changed to a supporting 
role.  Third, the relationships between the organizations are changing as their 
mandates increasingly intersect.  The most significant organization in this respect is, 
of course, the World Trade Organization. 
Impact of the SPS Agreement 
Neither Codex nor the OIE had to change their standard-setting practices when the 
WTO was formed.  Institutionally, each of these organizations is distinct and separate 
from the other.  They overlap, however, in two very important ways: membership and 
substantive focus.  In terms of membership all three are inter-governmental 
organizations, and—at least currently—tend to be among the most inclusive of 
international organizations.  Already discussed is the substantive overlap:  a common 
concern for linkages between food safety and trade. 
The question of why Codex and OIE are changing their standard-setting practices in 
response to the WTO’s SPS Agreement is important for understanding the political 
context surrounding rule-making in all three organizations.  Through its member 
countries Codex actively engaged GATT negotiators and encouraged its inclusion in the 
SPS Agreement.  In 1990 Codex held a conference to discuss possible linkages. 
The OIE, on the other hand, was not involved in the process of creating the SPS 
Agreement.  In fact, on the eve of that agreement’s passage the OIE was still debating 
whether or not it should allow its Secretariat to continue liaising with the WTO, let 
alone cooperate.  Today, however, the OIE has active relations with both the WTO and 
Codex. 
The SPS Agreement produced some similar changes at both the OIE and Codex.   First, 
while they had used science in their previous standards development, both began to 
adopt the rhetoric of using a more science-based approach.  The SPS Agreement also 
prompted an attempt to harmonize their understanding of science-based risk 
assessment.  Second, WTO requests for new standards and guidelines now regularly 
influence OIE and Codex agendas.  For instance, when the SPS Committee requested 
that standard-setting organizations develop guidelines on equivalence (and now 3. The International Rule-making Environment 
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regionalization) they did. Finally, both organizations began communicating with each 
other.    
The result of the SPS Agreement is a transformation in the regime complex 
surrounding international food safety rules.   There is greater development towards a 
rationalization of food safety law.  For one thing, areas of overlap and gaps in 
coverage are being addressed.  OIE’s relatively recent attention to its measures’ 
impacts on human health is clear evidence of this.  Perhaps more importantly, the 
core international organizations are now functionally integrated.  That is to say, there 
is a division of law-making, law-judging and law-enforcing mechanisms making 
international food safety rules more law-like than ever before.  The “law-making” 
functions are especially provided through Codex and the OIE.
 41   Those organizations 
have their spheres of standard-setting generally mapped out (with the mentioned 
exceptions) and act as collaborators more than as competitors in standard-setting.
42  
Other organizations, such as the ISO, play supplementary roles.  Central to making 
these rules matter for states and other actors, however, is the enforcement 
mechanism provided by the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism.   
The UN System & the WTO System 
While the OIE is relatively independent of other international organizations, Codex 
and the SPS Committee are not.  Codex, is the “child” of the FAO and WHO; the SPS 
Committee is only one part of the WTO. 
Of the three key international organizations, Codex is the least independent.  It faces 
two primary constraints.  First, it is tied to its institutional parents (the FAO and 
WHO).  FAO provides most of its budget and it is housed at FAO headquarters in Rome, 
so ties there are particularly strong.  Efforts were made in recent years to change 
this.  Some argue that FAO influence—perhaps unintentionally—leads Codex away from 
a stronger focus on human health protection.  In the past, the WHO and FAO have had 
disagreements of this sort over Codex. 
A  s e c o n d  c o n s t r a i n t  i s  t h a t  C o d e x  i s  p a r t  o f  t h e  U N  s y s t e m .   T h i s  m e a n s  t h a t —
theoretically, at least—procedural rules about such things as membership and 
observer’s rights should follow UN standards.  In practice, this is not always the case 
and the FAO legal office spends a great deal of time establishing that the exceptions 
made for Codex are unique, so as to not establish unwanted precedents for the rest of 
the UN system.   
The SPS Committee is clearly integrated into the rest of the WTO.  It is important to 
realize that decisions made in other parts of the WTO can impact the Committee’s on-
going work.  This happens in several ways. First, some rules—particularly procedural 
rules—debated in the SPS Committee are actually decided elsewhere.  The question of 
which new observers can come to meetings has been unresolved due to debate at a 
higher level. Second, some issues of a more substantive nature cut across all WTO 
a r e a s .   T h i s  i s  t h e  c a s e  w i t h  S p e c i a l  and Differential Treatment for developing 
countries where the issue is being discussed in all areas of the WTO.   
Third, it appears that some states use the SPS Committee to “score points” on issues 
of interests to them in other WTO areas and negotiations.  A few delegates suggested 
this was the case with respect to the on-going Doha Round of negotiations about 
agricultural trade rules.  Insiders say that some countries which claim to represent all 
developing countries are merely using extreme stances to score such points.  They 
                                                 
41I am not including the IPPC here due to its relatively insignificant importance to livestock food product safety standards.  
However, there is potential for the IPPC to matter, especially in the area of food safety issues related to feed. 
42 This is not to say there is no scope for conflict. 3. The International Rule-making Environment 
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become embarrassed when other countries, that need a more immediate, substantive 
resolution to an issue, say so. 
Importance of these Relationships to Strategies 
Country approaches to the food safety regime complex vary.  Savvy actors recognize 
and use the relationships for their advantage.  For some countries, rule-making 
strategy involves active coordination of policy in all three primary organizations. Some 
even have the same individuals attend meetings of multiple organizations and report 
substantial advantages in using insights gained in one setting in another.  
There are two general types of important strategic behaviors when confronting 
multiple organizations:  forum-shifting and issue-linking.  Forum-shifting involves 
manipulating the choice of fora for considering and making decisions on an issue.  A 
country may move an agenda from one organization to another, pursue it in multiple 
organizations, act to prevent an organization from addressing it and/or abandon an 
organization (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000).   In the area of food safety, there is clear 
evidence that states recently have practiced all but the last of these strategies.
43   
A recent SPS Committee debate on regionalization provides an example where two 
forum-shifting strategies occurred.  Regionalization refers to measures that allow 
countries affected with certain diseases to export from disease-free areas within their 
countries.
44  During recent meetings, Peru, Uruguay, Chile and several other countries 
asked the SPS Committee to begin establishing administrative guidelines for 
regionalization.  They argued that currently some importing countries take too long to 
recognize the disease-free and pest-free status of regions
45  within  exporting 
countries.
46  In their view it is part of the SPS Committee’s responsibility to develop 
guidelines for such recognition.
47 
Several countries have argued that the SPS Committee should not work on establishing 
guidelines at this point.  At one recent meeting New Zealand presented these 
arguments.  The delegate argued that the SPS Committee should not concern itself 
with rule-making in the area of regionalization until after the international standard-
setting organizations (specifically, the OIE and IPPC) develop their own guidelines for 
establishing the disease-or pest-free status of a region.  Some at the meeting seemed 
to suggest that the SPS Committee should not concern itself with even the 
development of administrative guidelines.   
In many respects this debate about regionalization reflects the practice of several 
forum-shifting strategies.  It was clear from interviews that some of those wishing the 
SPS Committee to take a stronger role in establishing administrative guidelines were 
concerned with granting the OIE and IPPC too much authority because of their own 
low participation in those alternative fora.  It was also clear that exporting interests 
                                                 
43 The creation of the WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), is an example of a strategy of 
abandoning an organization.  The United States, frustrated with attempts to develop rules in the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) temporarily “abandoned” that organization to focus on bringing in a new rule regime with TRIPs. 
44 Actually, there are two approaches towards regionalization.  The old approach is as mentioned above.  An example would 
be the case of a BSE case found in the state of Washington within the United States.  Guidelines could be established that 
would allow the US to effectively “seal off” that state and still export from the other parts of the country.  The new 
approach—frequently referred to as compartmentalization—refers to establishing that biosecurity management systems are 
free of disease (rather than geographical areas).   
45 Or compartments.  
46 Specifically, the concern is that even after disease- or pest-free status has been determined according to OIE or IPPC 
guidelines there is no rule about how soon importers must allow imports.  That is to say, the OIE and IPPC may determine 
timeframes for when it is scientifically safe practice to allow trade but they do not necessarily provide guidelines for 
administrative timeframes.  Additionally, it is the case that some countries do not automatically accept OIE’s designation of 
disease-free status without making their own confirmation. 
47 See for instance GEN/SPS/W/148. 3. The International Rule-making Environment 
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were involved (a new global policy on regionalization would certainly create new sets 
of winners and losers).  On the other hand, those arguing that the SPS Committee 
should defer to the OIE and IPPC clearly felt comfortable with the work that those 
organizations were accomplishing.  It is possible that this is a delay tactic as well.  It 
is unlikely, for instance, that the OIE will be able to create all the guidelines desired 
by member countries very quickly.  Currently, the OIE only has guidelines established 
for four diseases and those guidelines only deal with the technical aspects of 
preventing disease spread.  They do not deal with timeframes for recognition by other 
states of disease-free status.  The ability of the SPS Committee to influence OIE and 
IPPC agendas suggests another type of strategic behavior available to actors. 
Issue-linking is another powerful type of strategy and may be more common than 
forum-shifting.   Linking an issue in one forum to a different issue in the same or 
another forum may be a way weak states can reduce the natural advantages of strong 
states (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000).  Many issues discussed at the SPS Committee are 
linked to issues discussed in other areas of the WTO (Doha round negotiations on 
agriculture, for instance).  Trade concerns may also be linked.  Thus, as discussed 
later, it appears that Argentina’s complaints about Colombian beef import restrictions 






4.  ACTORS AND INTERESTS 
The international setting states and other a c t o r s  f a c e  i s  n o t  j u s t  c o m p o s e d  o f  
international organizations but of all other actors, their interests, and their actions.
48  
States are central, but it is useful to consider as well the role of non-state actors such 
as the agri-food industry, public interest groups, research and technical assistance 
groups, and poor producer advocates.
49 
States and Groups of States 
S t a t e s  d i f f e r  i n  w h a t  f o o d  s a f e t y  r u l e s  t h e y  w a n t  a n d  i n  t h e i r  i d e a s  f o r  
implementation.  Differences in geography, climate, and population characteristics 
impact the science and risk analysis of food safety.  Culture matters for perceptions of 
risk acceptability.  Europeans, for instance, appear to have a higher risk tolerance for 
the presence of Listeria in cheese made from unpasteurized milk (Unnevehr and 
Hirschhorn 2000). 
Developed Countries 
The most common way to divide states is by level of development.  The obvious 
difference between developed and developing countries is the greater resources of 
the former.  This goes a long way towards explaining the gaps in rule-making 
participation.  Developed countries are able to send more delegates more often to 
international organizations.  In the WTO it is not unusual to see six members of a 
developed country delegation sitting next to the sole member of a developing country 
delegation.  What makes the gap even greater, however, is the fact that the 
developing country delegate may represent his or her state in all WTO areas, whereas 
all six members of the developed country delegation are likely specialists. 
Developed countries have stronger ties to the firms that dominate world agricultural 
trade and production.  Annex 5 lists the largest firms for meat, dairy, and retail in 
terms of global sales.  Dyck and Nelson (2003) note that seven of the ten largest firms 
in terms of meat sales are in the US (the other three are in Switzerland, Japan, and 
Denmark).  It is also interesting to note that one of the world’s largest dairy firms, 
Fonterra, is based in New Zealand.  In fact, while most countries export a very small 
percentage of their dairy products in proportion to total domestic production, New 
Zealand exports a rather large percentage.  Inevitably, developed countries face a 
different kind of pressure from business lobbies than do developing countries. 
Developed countries also have stronger ties to consumers groups.  Indeed, much of the 
demand for food safety rules comes from developed country consumers.  For instance, 
in Europe the Transatlantic Consumer’s Dialogue played a key role in the beef 
hormone ban (Hoekman and Kostecki 2001).  The willingness of the EC to allow some 
cases to be brought to the WTO’s DSB, despite the likelihood of loss, can be explained 
by a need to demonstrate a willingness to protect consumer interests (Victor 2000). 
                                                 
48  This is loosely based on Lake and Powell (1999) who breakdown strategic settings into two elements. One is actor 
attributes and includes the actors’ preferences and belief about other actors’ preferences.  The other is environment 
attributes and includes environmental constraints on actor actions and on what the actor can know. 
49  A list of all NGOs at Codex is available at:  http://www.codexalimentarius.net/web/organizations_ngo.jsp.  A list of 
international organization observers at the WTO is available at:  http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/igo_obs_e.htm; of 
NGO participants at the WTO: http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/ngo_e/ngo_e.htm.  The OIE has some industry 
participation but—until recently—no non-industry NGO participation.  Recent NGO participation has primarily centered on OIE 
work in animal welfare. 4.  Actors and Interests 
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There are, of course, differences among the developed countries.  Some evidence 
suggests the US may be more intent on opening up markets, while the EU may be more 
intent on protecting its own (or at least demonstrates less willingness to change its 
own standards).  Countries have brought 43 specific trade concerns about EU measures 
to the SPS Committee, compared with 14 concerns in relation to US measures.  The EU 
has raised 39 concerns of its own regarding other countries’ policies; the US has raised 
49.
50 
The above characteristics of developed states mask an important characteristic 
underlying the quality of developed country participation:  developed countries tend 
to be repeat players.   
Repeat Players versus One-Shotters 
Some countries—due to the nature of their size or their trading patterns—have a 
higher frequency of interactions within the international legal system.  Broadly 
speaking, developed countries tend to be repeat players in the international system, 
whereas developing countries are often one-shotters (Galanter 1974; Byers 1999).
51  
That is to say, developed countries tend to have a greater number of interactions in 
the international legal system due to the greater number of issues that involve them.  
This provides developed countries with certain advantages, in term of expertise, 
connections with other key players, and an ability to focus on long-term strategies.  
Related to their position as repeat players, developed countries also played the key 
roles in creating the WTO, OIE, and Codex.  However, it should be mentioned that 
China, India, and several Latin American countries are all beginning to show the 
characteristics of repeat players.  Their size and their role in (especially agricultural) 
trade make this inevitable.  
In contrast, one-shotters have a number of disadvantages. First, they typically have 
small or unmanageable claims.   For instance, having a rule or a rule exception 
created so that Mauritania can export camel cheese (at first it was the only country 
producing the product), may be difficult because it matters only to Mauritania and it 
is unclear how high a priority it is for even Mauritania.
52  Second, they tend to pursue 
short-term legal strategies with little concern for overall impacts on the legal system.  
Often, developing countries react to specific trade problems rather than develop a 
consistent strategy for rule-making that could prevent such trade problems from 
arising in the first place. 
The underlying logic of this analysis seems to be that frequent involvement with the 
legal system privileges some states.  Thus, it may also be that even weaker countries, 
by increasing their involvement in the international legal system, can increase their 
influence.  Indeed, Galanter makes several prescriptions for weak parties that all 
center around aggregating the one-shotters into units large enough to be repeat 
players: 
“An organized group is not only better able to secure favorable rule 
changes, in courts and elsewhere, but is better able to see that good rules 
are implemented.  It can expand resources on surveillance, monitoring, 
threats or litigation that would be uneconomic for an OS [one-shotter].  Such 
units would in effect be RPs [repeat players].”  
                                                 
50 Through 2003. 
51  The terminology here is adopted from Galanter.  Galanter’s focus is the domestic legal system, but his general 
observations seem very applicable to the international system.  I owe a debt to Robert Kagan for directing me to this 
literature. 
52 Nancy Abeiderrahmane, founder of the dairy, remarks: "We only produce one kind of cheese. It is difficult to make, the 




In the WTO – and in many other international organizations – states declare for 
themselves whether or not they are “developed”.  One effect of this is that Chad’s 
rights and obligations as a developing country are similar to those of Brazil, India, and 
China, despite the obvious differences in levels of development.
53  Indeed, developing 
country interests are not homogenous and this can matter for food safety rule-making.  
The fact that some may be repeat players, as mentioned above, is one example.   
Developing country interests regarding specific trade concerns can run counter to each 
other.  Trade in agricultural products among developing countries is increasing.  47.6 
percent of developing country imports and 43 percent of exports involved other 
developing countries in 2002 (WTO G/SPS/GEN204 2004).  This means that developing 
countries are increasingly affected by the externalities of other developing countries’ 
policies.  It is notable, for instance, that many of the developing country trade 
concerns raised at the SPS Committee are from Latin American countries and a large 
percentage of those concerns involved other Latin American countries. 
Nevertheless, there are cases where groups of developing countries have similar 
interests.  For instance, development of the principle of equivalence—whereby 
countries acknowledge the SPS measures of other countries—is particularly important 
for smaller countries which may have a more difficult time demonstrating 
equivalence.  Likewise, rules about exceptions for developing countries, specifically 
those about special and differential treatment, have long provided common ground for 
many developing countries in areas outside food safety. 
To influence rule-making, developing countries must first participate.  However, 
developing country participation in developing international food safety rules is 
uneven.  While there is some evidence of an upward trend in their participation in 
international organizations, participation at that level is not necessarily enough.   
Oyejide describes several competencies a state should have for effective 
participation: (1) capacity to understand, internalize, and take advantage of 
agreements; (2) capacity to articulate trade objectives; and (3) capacity to “assert 
and defend its acquired trade and trade related rights” (Oyejide 2000).  Achieving 
such competency requires dedicated state resources, including support from the home 
capital.   
Insiders in the Codex, WTO, and OIE agreed that two characteristics of delegate 
participation are important.  One is longevity in individual delegate participation.   
Delegates who represent their countries for multiple years are more apt to develop 
the needed expertise and connections.  It may also allow them to rise to positions of 
authority within the organizations.  The first developing country chair of the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission rose to his position in that manner.  The second 
characteristic is participation of delegates from home country capitals.  Such 
delegates should have the needed authority and expertise to make decisions on behalf 
of their countries at international meetings.  Several members of developed country 
delegations expressed how impressed they are when this occurs.  All too often a 
delegate is present who lacks the authority and expertise to make decisions on issues 
at meetings, when they matter. 
As mentioned earlier, an important strategy for developing countries is collective 
action.  Several regional organizations play important roles in facilitating collective 
action.  The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) helps coordinate the 
positions of its member countries on SPS (and other) issues.  SPS meeting minutes 
regularly announce that the Philippines (the current ASEAN designate for SPS matters) 
                                                 
53 Although Chad, as a Least Developed Country, has some special rights that go beyond those developing countries receive as 
a class. 4.  Actors and Interests 
 
28 
is speaking on behalf of ASEAN member countries.  Recent attempts to create a 
Caribbean Food Safety Initiative also suggest potential for cooperation in that region. 
Sometimes regional cohesiveness is informal.  Anyone present at an SPS Committee 
meeting can quickly see that Latin American countries desire to support one another 
(despite their complaints about each others’ barriers).  When one speaks, others will 
often follow with their voices of support. The South African Development Community 
(SADC) members’ tendency to sit next to each other in SPS Committee meetings (as 
well as meetings in some other fora) is another example. 
Overall most developing countries are—at least so far—rule-takers.  Most find 
themselves modeling
54 the standards of leading states rather than participating in the 
creation of new standards.  This is unlikely to change for most low-income developing 
countries. 
Perhaps the greatest weakness of the international legal system is that it assumes 
states will participate even though it is impossible for full participation to occur.  In 
2001 there were more than 200 intergovernmental organizations, not including their 
subsidiary bodies (Union of International Associations 2005).  The WTO alone can 
average more than 40 meetings per week (Blackhurst, Lyakurwa et al. 1999).
55  Tiny 
member countries, such as St. Kitts and Nevis (pop. 38,000) simply cannot fully 
participate.  The United States State Department has more than 30,000 employees! 
The Agri-Food Industry 
The agri-food industry is enormous, employing millions of laborers around the world 
and produces more than $1 trillion (US) worth of goods. It is the largest manufacturing 
sector in Europe and one of the largest in the United States.
56  
A number of trends drive the agri-food industry towards a concern with food safety.  
Consumers in developed countries increasingly want food products that are both 
convenient and safe.  Firm reputation is a big issue here.  Second is the development 
of biotechnology.  Biotechnology is an aid to production but the safety of genetically 
modified foods is still in question.  A third trend involves the increasing use of 
information technology.   This affects how food is distributed and is used to enhance 
the traceability of food products “from the farm gate to the dinner plate”.  Indeed, 
the industry itself is undergoing transformations in response to these trends.  There is 
increasing vertical coordination and increasing use of global strategies for sourcing, 
distributing, and marketing foods (Lahidji 1997).  Such global, vertical coordination 
enhances the utility of international harmonization in food safety regulation. 
The relationship between business and international food safety rules is long-standing 
for two simple reasons.  One is that these rules impact business directly.  The costs of 
new rules are more visible to businesses while the benefits are more diffuse and 
difficult to measure for consumers.  The other is that much of the scientific and 
technical expertise needed to inform rule-making lies within firms. 
                                                 
54 See Braithwaite and Drahos (2000), pages 414-5, for more on modeling in this area. 
55  The World Development Movement (WDM) reports that the EU delegation to the Cancun Ministerial meeting had 651 
members, comparing this figure with developing country delegations such as Rwanda’s (3 members).  “WDM also calculated 
that the two richest delegations, the EU (651) and the US (212), representing approximately 10% of the world's population, 
have a total combined delegation of 863 - over three times the total of 235 for China, India, Brazil, Argentina and South 
Africa, who represent 51% of the world's population. It is also over twice the negotiating strength of the combined 
delegations of the 30 Least Developed Country members of the WTO (377).” 
http://www.wdm.org.uk/news/presrel/current/cancunnodeal2.htm.   
56 For more information, see the following websites:  http://www.foodnavigator.com/news/news-ng.asp?n=59413-european-
food-industry; http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/agoutlook/Dec2002/ao297k.pdf; 
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Firms can impact the rule-making process in a variety of ways.  They probably have 
their least direct influence at OIE, and their most at Codex.  Influence can occur 
through several channels, including: (a) direct lobbying, (b) lobbying through their 
own governments and participating as members of country delegations at the 
international level, and (c) supporting scientific research.  Often this is done through 
industry associations.
57    In terms of direct lobbying, industry has the largest non-
governmental presence at Codex.  One recent study found that 71% of INGOs with 
observer status are industry bodies (22% are professional and 8% consumer/public 
interest) (FAO/WHO 2002). A 1993 study found that industry representatives to Codex 
outnumbered public interest groups 445 to 8.  Important industry participants include 
Nestle,
58 Coca-Cola, Unilever, and Monsanto.   
Industry also works through governments, whether through lobbying or through 
participating as members of country delegations.  The 1993 study mentioned above 
found that 49% of US delegates and 61% of Swiss delegates to Codex were from 
industry.  The study noted that the total number of “US and Swiss industry 
representatives were greater in number than all the members from all the nations of 
Africa (Avery, Drake and Lang, 1993, cited in (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000)) 
Businesses also seek to influence the scientific community’s understanding of issues.  
Coca-Cola funded the International Life Sciences Institute (ILSI) and the Technical 
Caramel Association after a Codex Committee recommended a ban on caramel color 
additives (there was some concern about their impact on white bloodcell formation).  
Later, Ajinimoto, a Japanese marketer of mono-sodium glutinate (MSG), used ILSI to 
defend its own products (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000). 
Farmers are, of course, also a business interest but they have relatively little 
representation and clout.  Several farmer organizations participate to varying extents 
at Codex and the WTO.  Farmer groups, including the International Federation of 
Agricultural Producers (IFAP) and the Réseau des organisations paysannes et de 
producteurs agricoles de l'afrique de l'ouest (ROPPA), primarily concentrate their 
attention on the WTO’s Doha Round negotiations on agriculture.  With the exception 
of occasional calls for greater technical assistance, these organizations are relatively 
silent when it comes to the issue of food safety standards (especially as they impact 
poor livestock producers in developing countries). 
Public Interest Groups 
A variety of public interest groups attempt to influence the development of 
international food safety rules.  Most of this activity centers on Codex.  Some have 
very narrow concerns.  Examples of such groups include the Association of European 
Coeliacs Societies, International Baby Food Action Network, the European Heart 
Network, the European Network of Childbirth Associations, the International Baby 
Food Action Network, the International Lactation Consultant Association, the Rural 
Advancement Foundation International, and the Pesticides Action Network (CI 2000). 
Consumers International (Union of International Associations) is the most visible 
broad-based consumer group, but other important groups include the Transatlantic 
                                                 
57 Examples of some important industry associations active at the WTO, Codex, and/or OIE are:  European Round Table of 
Industrialists, World Business Council for Sustainable Development, International Chamber of Commerce, US Dairy Foods 
Association, Pork Producers Council (US), the Confederation of the Food and Drink Industries (CIAA—Europe), the World 
Federation of the Animal Health Industry (COMISA), the Council for Responsible Nutrition, and the Global Crop Protection 
Federation. 
58 Several studies and several interviewed for this study singled out Nestle’s influence at Codex.  Nestle appears to send the 
most industry representatives to Codex.  Between 1989 and 1992, Nestle sent more representatives than all but 22 of Codex’ 
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Consumer’s Dialogue, International Association of Consumer Food Organizations, 
International Co-Operative Alliance, and the European Consumers’ Organisation 
(BEUC).  Consumer groups focus on ensuring that international rule-making guarantees 
the safety of food products.  While developing country consumers are often 
represented at international meetings, this does not benefit the poor small producer 
of livestock products. Consumer desire for inexpensive (and safe) food may lead to 
preference for imported products. 
There are, of course, a large number of groups actively promoting the reform or 
termination of the WTO.  They are not, however, active at the SPS Committee. 
Research & Technical Assistance Groups 
Research and Technical Assistance Groups play different roles than the other actors 
discussed in this section.  They provide the scientific advice that forms the basis for 
the creation or modification of standards and/or the assistance some require for 
implementing the standards.   
Groups involved in scientific research and technical assistance have a variety of 
affiliations to other actors mentioned in this study.  Some, like ILSI, conduct research 
on behalf of industry.  Others, such as the International Livestock Research Institute 
(ILRI), have a focus on producing research that benefits the poor. 
There are also groups that seem to bridge the ties between industry and developing 
countries.  The Industry Council for Development (ICD) is a non-profit organization 
that works with WHO, FAO, governments, and NGOs.  The members of ICD are firms, 
but the clients are developing countries.  ICD’s goal is to help those countries reach 
their food safety and nutrition goals. 
Professional associations such as the European Food Law Association and the World 
Veterinary Association also attend international meetings, but are not particularly 
active. 
Poor Producer Interests 
None interviewed during the course of this study could identify advocacy groups that 
specifically represent the interests of poor producers in developing countries in the 
relevant international fora.  However, there are a number of groups involved in 
promoting animal health and/or concerned with linkages between poor producers and 
food safety.  While none of them are active participants in rule-making, they could do 
more to provide the scientific advice needed for international standard-setting.
59  
Vétérinaires Sans Frontières is an example of such a group. 
A number of groups seek to promote the interests of poor farmers more generally.  
These groups lobby at the national level and/or at the WTO.   Their primary target for 
activism at the WTO is the Agreement on Agriculture and the work with respect to SPS 
measures usually is limited to general position statements.  Oxfam, for instance, has 
b e e n ve r y  a ct i ve  i n  lo b b y i ng  fo r  a  fa i r  t r a d i ng  s y s t e m .   A no t he r  ca t e g o r y  o f  a ct o r  
relevant here is the fair trade movement (which includes Oxfam) which has supported 
poor producer exports of a variety of food and handicraft items, though not yet 
livestock food products. 
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For some, a primary goal is the dismantling of the WTO.  Examples of such groups 
include  Via Campesina, the Land Research Action Network, the National Union of 
Autonomous Regional Farmers’ Organizations (Mexico), the Assembly of the Poor 
(alliance of various groups in Thailand), Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem 
Terra (MST, the Landless Workers Movement in Brazil), and People’s Food 
Sovereignty.
60   
                                                 
60 The perspective of this paper, however, is one of working within the existing system, not one of system change.  One 
weakness in the position of groups that desire that the WTO “get out of agriculture”, is that they do not offer a clearly viable 
alternative.  Via Campesina, for instance, still wants governments to control the spread of disease and pests to ensure food 
safety, but does not explain how governments can do this without an international organization (at least not in the literature 
I reviewed).  Some international trade will always occur (there are, for instance, some countries that simply cannot produce 
enough food for their own people) and some means of regulating that trade to ensure food safety will always be necessary.  
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5.  CASES OF INTERNATIONAL RULE-MAKING 
Many food safety rules are made with little controversy.   However, controversy and 
conflict do occur and such cases provide a window into the political dynamics that 
accompany the legal processes we normally see.   
This section provides sketches of six cases of rule-making.  The intent is to illustrate 
key aspects of the political and organizational dynamics of food safety rule-making.  
Not all the cases involve developing countries, let alone their poor producers.  The 
first is the EU-US dispute over the use of beef hormones.  This case highlights some of 
the changes in the food safety regime complex.  The second case is the development 
of standards for aflatoxin in nuts and milk.  Here developing countries played a highly 
visible role.  The question of whether their participation made a difference is 
relatively murky, however.  A third case illustrates the inter-organizational dynamics 
within the food safety regime complex by considering the development of rules for 
BSE.  The fourth case involves a dispute between Argentina and Colombia over a ban 
on imports of Argentinean beef.  The section concludes by discussing two cases where 
poor developing country producers have not benefited from international rule-making. 
Beef Hormones:  The SPS Agreement’s Difference 
Public anxieties about the presence of the illegal hormone diethylstilbestrol (DES) in 
Italian baby food prompted the EU to a series of bans on beef hormone use in the 
1980s (Roberts 1998).  In 1981 the European Community placed its first ban on the 
import of beef raised using growth hormones.  In 1985 this ban was extended (after an 
important European Parliament vote) to include three more natural hormones and two 
synthetic hormones.  This had its most direct effect on US beef producers who had 
been using hormones since the 1970s.
61   The ban on hormones continues today.   
However, the case teaches important lessons about rule-making, dispute resolution, 
and the impact of the SPS Agreement on these processes (U.S. Foreign Agriculture 
Service 2003). 
The EC argued that the ban’s intent was the promotion of public health.  According to 
the EC, hormone residues remained in mea t  f r o m  c o w s  r a i s e d  o n  t h e m .   T h e s e  
hormone residues, they argued, were unsafe for public consumption.  The US, on the 
other hand, argued that the ban’s intent was to protect EC beef producers.  Indeed, 
the ban was extended to include all hormones and in 1988 the EC banned all US meat 
(U.S. Foreign Agriculture Service 2003). 
First Dispute Resolution Attempt  
In 1987 the US challenged the EC under the 1979 TBT Agreement, requesting the 
establishment of a technical experts group to consider the justifications for the EC 
ban.   The EC attempted to block this, arguing that TBT applied only to end products 
and that this was instead a process issue.  Nevertheless, the US retaliated by placing 
tariffs on European imports.  The dispute was left unresolved (Kastner 2001).
62 
                                                 
61 European farmers were also using these hormones until the ban. 
62 Some link US involvement in strengthening Codex was linked to the economic impact of the beef hormone ban.  US officials 
were also concerned with how Japan’s stringent phytosanitary standards regarding apples were blocking US exports 
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Second Dispute Resolution Attempt 
The Uruguay Round’s completion in 1995 offered the EU and US a new set of rules to 
consider for the dispute.  The new SPS Agreement and Dispute Settlement Mechanism 
were significant departures from the previous GATT-TBT regime.  It was not long 
before the US requested the establishment of a Dispute Settlement Panel.  That panel 
decided that the EU’s ban on growth hormones was not based on scientific evidence, 
nor had the EC carried out a sufficient risk assessment.  An Appellate body upheld the 
ruling.  The EC immediately interpreted this as a sign that they needed to produce 
more scientific studies supporting their claims.
63  The US interpreted it as a victory.  It 
won approval to retaliate by continuing their previous policy of placing tariffs on 
European imports so long as Europe continued the ban.
64 
Key to the WTO decision was the standards set by Codex.  Codex had decided that 
beef hormones were not a risk for consumers.  Despite the long history of growth 
hormone use, Codex did not create standards for their use until the 1990s.  The 
primary reason for this was the dispute between the EC and US.  The US, however, 
had an advantage at Codex.  It was (and remains) chair of the Committee on Residues 
o f  V e t e r i n a r y  D r u g s  i n  F o o d s .   I t  h a d  f a iled once before to get the committee to 
approve the use of hormones.  However, a later vote at a 1995 meeting to stop action 
on the issue failed.  The US was then able to get a favorable vote (by secret ballot) on 
the issue of hormones themselves.
 65  US moves to obtain support for the use of beef 
hormones were bolstered by analysis of the issue from a key Codex advisory body, the 
FAO/WHO Joint Expert Committee on Food Addditives (JECFA). JECFA had established 
the safety of the five hormones in dispute and proposed standards for adoption.
66 
The OIE did not play a significant role in this even though the application of animal 
growth hormones is clearly related to their mandate.  That is not to say the OIE would 
not play a role today.  One key player in these issues today is the International 
Cooperation on Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Registration of 
Veterinary Medicinal Products (VICH) program.
 67  VICH was started in 1996 following a 
decade of discussions between the US and EU.  It is a trilateral (EU-Japan-US) 
initiative aimed at harmonizing technical requirements for veterinary drug 
registration, and the head of the OIE Collaborating Centre on Veterinary Drugs chairs 
the Steering Committee. 
The hormone case is not just a case for developed countries.  In recent years Chile, 
Mexico and South Africa have allowed the use of growth hormones (Inforum 2001).  On 
the other hand, Indonesia’s attempt to ban the import of hormone-treated beef met 
quick resistance in a 2003 meeting of the SPS Committee (WTO G/SPS/R28). 
Aflatoxin: A Developing Country Victory? 
In 1960, 100,000 poultry died in the UK from a new disease, first called “Turkey X 
disease” and later known to be aflatoxin (Saad 2004).  Aflatoxin is a complex of toxins 
                                                 
63  Indeed the EC’s own studies were varied in their results.  The first commissioned Lamming report of 1982 found that 
hormone use presented no significant risks.  Some later studies suggested there were risks, but they considered the problem 
of direct human exposure to high levels of hormones rather than to hormones found as residues in meat. 
64 Canada was brought on as a third party to the dispute and won a similar right to retaliate. 
65 The dominance of host country agendas was mentioned in a recent Codex evaluation (FAO/WHO 2002). 
66 Standards were eventually adopted regarding the safety of five growth-promoting hormones.  Three of these are naturally-
occurring: estradiol-17beta, progesterone, and testosterone.  The two others are synthetic:  trenbolene acetate and zeranol.  
Codex has yet to set a standard for third synthetic hormone used in the United States, melangestrol acetate (MGA).  Since 
this beginning of this dispute, the use of recombinant bovine Somatotropin (rbST) as a growth promotant to boost milk yields 
has been a topic of further dispute between the EU and US. 
67 More information is available on the VICH webiste: http://vich.eudra.org/htm/what.htm#t2 
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formed by molds and can occur in a variety of agricultural products including nuts and 
grains.  Cows that eat feed contaminated by aflatoxin may also produce contaminated 
milk.  This matters for human health because high levels of exposure may cause liver 
disease, cancer, and Reyes Disease.  A 1974 outbreak in Northwest India may have 
killed 108 people and affected many more (FDA 2004).  In Europe, countries responded 
to this by establishing their own standards.   
In 1998 the European Community notified WTO members that harmonizing disparate 
standards within the EU had led them to adopt a standard of no more than 10 ppb of 
aflatoxin for groundnuts and 0.05 ppb for its presence in milk, more stringent 
standards than previously required by many European states.  At the time, Codex was 
still debating what its standard should be (perhaps due to EC intransigence on the 
issue in that forum).  However, JECFA (playing a key advisory role here as well) had 
already created its report.  It recommended limiting the intake of aflatoxins to levels 
as low as reasonably possible.
68  It also noted that the difference in a standard of 10 
ppb and 20 ppb (that desired by most other countries) for Europeans was that 
approximately 2 lives per billion might be saved each year (WHO 1999).
69   
At the SPS Committee, the new EC standard prompted the biggest reaction yet from 
member states.  Ten developing countries and one developed country (Australia) 
argued at the March 1998 meeting that the new EC levels made no significant positive 
impact on human health while placing severe restrictions on international trade (WTO 
G/SPS/R/12).  Those countries would later be joined by many other states (including 
the United States) in calling for the EC to change its standard.  The concerns of these 
countries appeared to be supported by researchers.  From a scientific perspective, 
there was little evidence that a standard set at 10 ppb led to significantly greater 
health benefits than one set at 20 ppb. On the other hand, it was clear that meeting a 
more stringent standard would have a significant effect on producers.  A well-known 
World Bank paper (Wilson, Otsuki et al. 2003) estimated that the implementation of 
the new EC standard would decrease Africa’s cereal, dried fruits and nuts “exports by 
64 percent or US $670 million in contrast to regulation set at an international [Codex] 
standard”.  This was especially significant given that Europe is Africa’s greatest 
trading partner and the importance of agricultural exports to African economies. 
There were, in fact, several forces opposing the European standard.  First, developing 
countries were able to provide an effective argument about the effect of these 
measures on their trade with Europe.  Philippines, representing ASEAN, and India 
argued that the proposed minimum standards for milk were unreasonable and would 
have strong negative consequences for trade.
70  Senegal argued that it made no sense 
for the EC, which at the time was encouraging Senegalese groundnut production for 
human consumption, to put in place a measure that would severely restrict their 
ability to export.  At the time, 74% of Senegalese groundnut exports went to the EC.
71  
Arguably, developing countries had the most to lose if the EC’s higher standard had 
stood.  Their ability to argue from a position of need and credibly demonstrate the 
negative impacts on their relatively fragile economies were important. 
However, it also appears that developing country positions were substantively 
supported by the interests of developed states. Some argue that in this case – as in 
many other WTO cases – the result was a compromise between the United States 
(which desired less stringent standards because of its domestic nut and grain industry 
                                                 
68 However, it also stated that the “greatest relative impact on estimated average aflatoxin levels is achieved” by limiting 
contamination to less than 20 ppb. 
69 Interestingly, the higher standard could save 300 lives per billion in China, given the different population characteristics 
built-in to their model. 
70WTO G/SPS/GEN/54 and G/SPS/GEN/62. 
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interests) and the EU’s positions (Silverglade 2000).  The fact that the current 
standard is the middle figure of 15 ppb is suggestive. 
It is also important to note the relationship between SPS Committee activities and 
activities occurring in Codex.  The EC notified the WTO of its intended standard only a 
year before Codex was to meet and discuss setting its own standard.
72  Notes from the 
April 1998 SPS Committee meeting where the complaints were first made suggest that 
the EU recognized its role in blocking consensus at Codex (WTO G/SPS/R10).  It also 
sought to use the WTO’s Appellate Body R e p o r t  f r o m  t h e  E C  H o r m o n e s  c a s e  t o  
undermine some of the relevance of Codex norms. 
Finally, it is worth singling out business interests within the developed states.  Several 
interviewed for this study suggested that such business interests provided the 
information submitted to the WTO by some developing country members on the 
aflatoxin case.  A simple search on the internet leads to a report by the Healthy Nut 
Initiative, formed in Hamburg in 1997 by the International Nut Council, the German 
Peanut Council, and various national associations to oppose the EU Commission’s 
proposed standard.
73  Information from such sources may have played an important 
role. 
This aflatoxin case is an example where developing countries identified proposed 
maximum residue limits (MRLs) as potential threats to their trade.  MRLs pose a 
specific challenge in food safety standard-setting.  Developing countries occasionally 
complain that the MRLs set by standard-setting organizations can be unnecessarily 
strict (as in the case of aflatoxin in milk) with no clear health benefit over a less strict 
standard which may be more practical.  This is especially the case when enforcing a 
stricter standard requires laboratory equipment such countries may not have. 
Mad Cows:  Limits to Public Rules 
The UK announced the existence of a new disease affecting humans in 1996:  variant 
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD).  The cause of this degenerative brain disease 
appeared to be consumption of animal products (specifically, beef) tainted with 
another transmissible spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) – Bovine Spongiform 
Encephelopathy (BSE), perhaps better known as “Mad Cow Disease”.  Since its 
discovery, BSE has been detected in livestock in many European countries, Canada, 
the United States, Japan, the Falkland Islands, Oman, and Israel.
74 
The announcement prompted a public health crisis and undermined public 
confidence—especially in Europe—in the safety of food supplies.  BSE, after all, had 
been found present in cattle as early as 1986 and given vCJD’s apparent long gestation 
period in humans it was impossible to know how many people could have been 
infected and how far outside the UK BSE could have spread.
75  Most of these questions 
are still unanswered.   
                                                 
72 This is a short time relative to the length of time it typically takes Codex to adopt a standard.  Codex adopted a standard 
in 1999 for the presence of aflatoxin in “peanuts intended further processing” (revised 2001).  The current standard allows 
for up to 15 ppb.  In 2001 Codex agreed on a standard of 0.5 ppb in milk.  EU member states, desiring a much lower standard 
(highest levels allowed being 0.05 ppb) expressed their reservations but did not block the decision.  Consumers International 
also expressed some reservations. 
73 I received unconfirmed reports that European nut importers directly provided developing countries with information that 
was later used in documents submitted to the SPS Committee and SPS Committee discussions. 
74 These include native and non-native (animals imported from disease-affected countries) cases.  For most countries, the 
number of BSE cases detected so far has been extremely small (WHO 2002). 
75 Determining its spread is further complicated by the fact that no test exists that can identify the presence of BSE in live 
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Mad Cow Disease provides one of the clearest examples of the link between OIE 
activities and food safety.  Most of the concern for BSE and most of the pressure on 
the OIE to develop rules occurred after the UK announcement of its link to vCJD.  The 
OIE began developing guidelines for BSE in the early 1990s and classified BSE as a List 
B disease, signifying that it is easier to contain than some (List A) diseases.
76  The OIE 
provides guidelines for establishing five levels of exporting country status based on 
risk level (free, provisionally free, minimal risk, moderate risk, high risk).  There are 
greater restrictions on the categories of meat that can be exported from countries as 
risk level increases.  However, some categories of meat (given proper testing) can be 
exported from countries of all levels.  That meat, according to OIE guidelines, can be 
assumed safe.   
Despite such guidelines, countries regularly place bans on all bovine meat products 
from countries where BSE has been detected.   Sometimes, the ban is extended to 
other meat products as well.
77  This inevitably leads to disputes over the legality of 
those bans.  TSEs have been an especially important item on the SPS Committee 
agenda.  Roughly 16 % of the concerns raised at meetings involved TSEs.  The role of 
the committee as a forum for discussing related trade disputes is important.   
The case of Mad Cow disease illustrates some of the limits to the authority of 
international organizations.  Current histories of the spread of BSE and regulatory 
reactions invariably focus on the actions of state regulators.
78  The OIE’s efforts to 
reassure importing countries that some meat products from BSE-infected countries are 
safe is an example.  For country ministers responsible for ensuring the safety of food 
imports, the potential political risk of making the wrong choice is high.   
Argentina v. Colombia: FMD and beef  
Trade between developing countries also faces inappropriate uses of SPS Measures.  
Uruguay has complained about El Salvador’s bans on its meat and dairy products (WTO 
G/SPS/R17).  Costa Rica and other South American countries have complained about 
Honduran restrictions on poultry meat imports, Argentina and Indonesia have had 
disputes about dairy products:  all are concerns brought to the SPS Committee.  In 
many of these cases Latin American countries have been involved.   
One recent case involved Colombian restrictions on Argentinian meat imports 
following an FMD outbreak in Argentina in 2001.  Colombia set requirements for plant 
inspections within Argentina in order for trade resumption.  In 2002, Argentina raised 
the concern at the WTO’s SPS Committee that Colombia continued to restrict imports 
despite the fact that no new outbreaks were occurring.  Argentina also claimed that 
Colombia was slow in carrying out the plant inspections it required.  For its part, 
Colombia complained at the end of 2002 that Argentina was blocking imports of fresh 
flowers.  There was the suggestion that the two issues were now linked, although 
Argentina denied such claims.  Colombia said it would need further information from 
Argentina before resuming imports.   
                                                 
76 This system of Lists is no longer practiced by the OIE. 
77  There is ample evidence suggesting that BSE is not just a problem for cattle and humans.  Numerous animals have 
contracted TSEs in laboratory testing and a recent outbreak among goats in Europe provides further reason for concern. 
78 The OIE, Codex, and WTO are missing from histories reported by TV stations and other media sources.  See, for example:  
http://www.kirotv.com/health/2771940/detail.html,  http://www.newscientist.com/popuparticle.ns?id=in43, and 
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In October 2003 Argentina reported a resolution to the issue, stating that Colombia 
had eliminated its restrictions.  Colombia stated that the fresh flowers issue also was 
discussed during their bilateral consultations.
79 
Several points about this case are worth mentioning.  First, it demonstrates the role of 
the SPS Committee in facilitating dispute resolution.  It provided a public forum for 
both countries to give notice of their complaints, and in the process provided 
information to other countries about how SPS measures were being applied.  Second, 
it demonstrates an example of issue-linking, common in trade dispute resolution 
though rarely stated so clearly. 
Out of the Loop: Mauritanian Camel Cheese & East African Livestock 
The lack of power on the part of developing countries can be viewed through the lens 
of unresolved trade disputes hurting poor producers.  Developing countries are 
increasingly aware of the impact of SPS measures on their trade.  However, this does 
not mean they bring the issues to the international organizations.  Most attempts to 
resolve issues takes place at the bilateral level.  This has been the case for 
Mauritanian camel cheese producers.  East African livestock producers, on the other 
hand, have been limited by the fact that a major trade partner (Saudi Arabia) is not a 
member of the WTO and thus not subject to the strictures of the SPS Agreement. 
Mauritainian Camel Cheese 
A dairy in Mauritania has the unique trait of producing all its dairy products from 
camels, including cheese.  In 1987, Nancy Abeiderrahmane started the dairy company 
Tiviski.  Since that time she has won several awards for her innovation in developing 
an enterprise that could bring direct benefit to many small producers of camel milk.  
It is truly a small producer – based operation.  Tiviski collects its milk from more than 
1000 camels – each producing a scant 3.5 litres per day.  The milk is collected using an 
ad hoc collection system: the dairy sends people in 4X4s out to collect from the 
producers, most of whom are nomadic.  The seasonal nature of the dairy, however, 
means that at certain times they have more milk than needed.  One solution was the 
development of the world’s first camel cheese.  But since Mauritanians do not eat 
cheese, the hope was to sell it to Europeans.  Indeed, the cheese was a hit at a 
German cheese fair and plans were made to begin exporting to Europe.
80  
Unfortunately, EU food safety rules make no provisions for camel cheese and the EU 
decided that cheese would have to come from camels milked mechanically.
81   The 
decision was not based on any clear risk assessment.   Mechanical milking in such a 
small-scale and dispersed operation is not economically feasible and—despite many 
efforts and much publicity surrounding the issue—Tiviski is still unable to export its 
cheese.
82  The issue is not being considered at Codex
83 and—interestingly—there is no 
report of Mauritania ever attending a meeting of the SPS Committee. 
                                                 
79 Much of the above relies on WTO G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev. 5/Add. 3) 
80 So said Nicholas Stern of the World Bank in a speech. 
81 Another obstacle the dairy faced is that the EC does not allow any animal products to be imported from Mauritania.  The 
EC requires Mauritania to have a sanitary control system and an approved laboratory that can certify that a product meets 
necessary standards. (Bianchi 2005; Stern 2002). 
82 The issue of mechanical milking is not only a problem for camel cheese.  The same issue blocks small-scale dairy producers 
in India from exporting their dairy products to the EU (case cited in Mehta and George 2004). 
83 This is according to the author’s most recent information. 5. Cases of International Rule-making 
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East African Livestock 
Second is the case of East African livestock.  The livestock sector has great potential 
in some East African studies.  One recent study suggests that two commodity 
categories—beef/veal and cow milk—are among the top five commodities in the region 
with greatest potential for investment (IFPRI 2004). 
One obstacle to development of the livestock sector, however, is its ability to meet 
international food safety standards.  A particular problem for the region is Rift Valley 
Fever (RFV).  RFV is a viral infection that affects animals and humans.
84  It has been 
the cause for Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf States export bans more than once 
in the past 10 years.  In 1997 an outbreak occurred in Somalia and Kenya.  The result 
was an immediate drop in livestock exports of up to two-thirds.  That ban was lifted in 
1998 (FEWSNET 2004). 
In 2000 a new ban
85 on livestock and livestock products from the Horn
86 was put in 
place after cases of RVF were discovered in Saudi Arabia and Yemen.  The ban was put 
in place even though no clear linkages were established between the epidemic and 
African imports.  OIE rules recommend that bans should be in place for at least three 
years.  The length of a ban could even be extended by the fact that many of the 
African countries placed on the ban may not have the resources necessary to establish 
the safety of their exports. 
No one interviewed for this study at the WTO, Codex, or OIE seemed aware of these 
issues.  There is one great reason for this.  Saudi Arabia is not yet a member of the 
WTO (although it seems likely this will change soon).  This means that Saudi Arabia 
faces no threats under the SPS Agreement, making it easier to ban imports for food 
safety concerns.       
Summary Analysis of the Case Studies 
These cases teach us a series of lessons about international food safety rule-making.  
The beef hormones case teaches two lessons.  First, the case supports the conclusion 
that international rule-making has undergone significant changes in the past two 
decades and much of this is due to the SPS Agreement.  That agreement increased the 
relevance of international standards to trade disputes and created new principles for 
guiding the settlement of such disputes.  Second, the beef hormones case illustrates 
the role the WTO dispute settlement process plays in food safety rule-making.  Though 
not used often, dispute settlement can refine states’ understandings of their rights 
and obligations and it can clarify the status of standards created by international 
standard-setting organizations.  In this case, the WTO accepted Codex standards on 
beef hormones, though passed by Codex with a narrow voting margin.
87  Panel and 
Appellate Body decisions provided some of the guidelines that the EU would have to 
follow to justify their own different standards. 
A third lesson from these cases is that international rule-making is interdependent.  
Rules made in one organization can impact rules and enforcement outcomes in other 
organizations.  There are two primary ways that this manifests itself.  One is when the 
organizations act as functionally integrated units.  These are the cases where dispute 
resolution in the WTO relies on the standards set by Codex and/or the OIE.  The WTO 
process can clarify and harden interpretations of these standards.  The other way is 
                                                 
84 Approximately 1% of infected humans die from the disease.  It can be contracted through mosquitoes or handling meat. 
85 The Persian Gulf States participating in the ban include Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Yemen and the United Arab 
Emirates. 
86Nine African states were targeted for the ban.  
87 The EU would argue that the narrow voting margin reduced the normative value of the Codex standard. 5. Cases of International Rule-making 
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through the development of general princip l e s  i n  f o o d  s a f e t y  g o v e r n a n c e .   A s  
explained earlier in the paper, the SPS Agreement affected how the Codex and OIE 
approach the standard-setting process, their focus now being on the use of science-
based risk assessment.  But the organizations continue to affect each other’s rule-
making through occasionally simultaneous discussions of principles such as equivalence 
and regionalization. 
Fourth, although developed countries still dominate international rule-making, poor 
producer interests can play an important role in deliberations.  Even though science is 
the intended basis for rule-making practical considerations also play a role.  Thus in 
the aflatoxin case prima facie health-related concerns
88 were tempered by realization 
of the need for rules fair to (in particular) developing country exporters.  The case 
demonstrates the potential role that MRLs can play as a trade barrier. 
Fifth, this system of international rules has limits for poor producers.  In one case—
Mauritania—camel cheese producers have faced numerous obstacles in bilateral 
negotiations.  The SPS Agreement has so far been of limited utility.  The SPS 
Agreement has also had little impact on trade disputes over East African livestock 
exports to Saudi Arabia, mostly due to the fact that Saudi Arabia is not yet a member 
of the WTO.  While in both of these cases future benefits could come from 
engagement by the affected countries at the relevant international organizations, it 
remains unclear whether single issues such as this are worth the heavy costs of 
participation.  This is one reason small states may benefit from regional coordination 
in food safety rule-making. 
 
                                                 
88  A risk assessment by JEFCA stated that aflatoxin levels in milk of 0.5ppb or 0.05 ppb did not make a significant difference 
to the health of consumers.  The EU apparently argued for the 0.05ppb limit because this ‘was achievable and easily 
detectable’.  
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6.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Achieving safe food should be a goal for all countries, all peoples and all producers.  
Where scientific risk assessments demonstrate food hazards exist, developing 
countries and poor producers should not fight standard-setting but instead find ways 
to obtain assistance in meeting those standards.  A two-tiered system of standards—
where one set of standards applies for export markets and a different set of standards 
applies for domestic markets—is likely unethical and in most cases is impractical.
89  
This is true whether it is the case of developed states exporting lower quality products 
to developing states, or developing states exporting higher quality products and 
allowing their own citizens to consume lower quality products. 
Interventions in the area of international food safety standards need to take place 
within a larger strategic framework.  If the overall goal is the expansion of livestock 
production by poor producers,
90 then food safety standards may be important, but will 
only be one factor among many determining the overall competitiveness of poor 
producers.  Other factors include political stability, basic infrastructure needs, access 
to inputs, other non-tariff barriers and tariff barriers.  
Most of public international food safety rules concern trade-related aspects of food 
safety and in many cases such rules will not be directly relevant to poor producers.  
However, as described in Section Two, there are cases where standards do matter.  
Some of the potential effects are negative—such as decreased export potential for 
some producers, but standards combined with proper technical assistance can also 
enhance poor producer productivity. 
The study identified the WTO, Codex and OIE as the primary international 
organizations relevant to public international rules for livestock food product safety.  
The WTO’s SPS Agreement significantly altered the international rule-making 
environment.  General principles were created and revised, most notably the 
supplanting of the principle of national treatment by the principle of international 
treatment and the clarification that science-based risk assessment procedures should 
guide standard-setting.  There were also changes in the relationships among 
international organizations.  Codex and the OIE actively collaborate in new ways, for 
instance. 
The interests of poor developing country producers of livestock food products are not 
directly represented in international food safety rule-making.  Indirectly, their 
interests may be represented by their own governments but developing country 
participation in relevant rule-making activity is limited.  Additionally, it is clear that 
developing country governments interests will not necessarily be the same as those of 
their own poor producers. 
Influencing the development of rules requires an understanding of the international 
organizational environment and the capacities and interests of relevant actors.   
Specifically, it is important to consider (a) the unique rule-making dynamics of each 
organization; (b) the degree to which these organizations are embedded in other 
international organizations (Codex is embedded in the UN system, for instance); (c) 
the dynamics that formal and informal linkages between these organizations create; 
(d) the relevant differences in capacities of states for participation in these 
organizations; (e) the different situations of repeat players and one-shotters; (f) how 
coordination among one-shotters can provide some of the advantages of repeat 
                                                 
89 A recent FAO report, for instance, warns of the negative ethical dimensions associated with a policy whereby affluent 
consumers benefit from higher standards than poor consumers (FAO 2003c). 
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players (for instance, through regional organizations); and (g) the relatively high level 
of engagement by industries and consumer groups compared to those with pro-poor 
concerns in lobbying for rules and shaping scientific discourse.  These factors are 
important determinants of the constraints and opportunities the current international 
rule-making system has for poor livestock producers and their advocates. 
Recommendations 
The paper’s central question was how public
91 international food safety rule-making 
might be friendlier to poor livestock producer interests.  This final section puts 
forward a series of recommendations for accomplishing just that.  First, key current 
issues are highlighted.  These are issues about the development of specific primary 
rules (obligations states face in setting standards and the actual standards) and 
secondary rules (rules about how those primary rules are made).  Next, strategic 
recommendations for influencing international rule-making are presented for two sets 
of actors:  (a) poor producers and their advocates and (b) developing countries. 
Important Issues 
Secondary Rules 
Three types of rules are important to poor producers and their advocates.  First are 
the rules about rule-making (the so-called secondary rules). As discussed elsewhere, 
there are three key rule-making environments:  the WTO’s SPS Committee, the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission, and the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE).   
Criticisms of the nature of developing country participation in rule-making activities 
exist in all three bodies.  Indeed, one important set of secondary rules are rules that 
influence who gets to participate in international rule-making and the quality of their 
participation.   
Two items currently being discussed at the SPS Committee are relevant in this 
respect.
92   First is the issue of Special and Differential Treatment for developing 
countries.  Some of the potential provisions may change how international rules are 
settled.  For instance, there are discussions about much time a developing country has 
to object to a new sanitary and phytosanitary measure imposed by an importer.   
Second is the issue of Technical Assistance and Training Activities.  One theme of this 
paper and elsewhere is that developing country capacity for participating in 
international rule-making activities and complying with international rules is limited.  
Thus, capacity-building and technical assistance activities are (unsurprisingly perhaps) 
important.
93   
Capacity-building and technical assistance are also issues at Codex and the OIE.  The 
OIE has a long history of providing assistance to country delegates to attend its annual 
                                                 
91 While this study focused on public international rules, it is clear that private international rules are increasingly important 
to poor producer interests.  Any parties interested in developing the production and marketing potential of these producers 
must take into account these private rules. 
92 The SPS Committee is concluding its second operation and implementation review.  That review tackles the following 
subject areas:  - Consistency (Article 5.5); - Equivalence (Article 4); - Transparency (Article 7 and Annex B); - Monitoring the 
use of international standards (Article 3.5 and 12.4); Technical assistance and training activities (Article 9); - 
Special and differential treatment (Article 10); - Regionalization (Article 6);  Monitoring Implementation of the Agreement 
(Articles 12.1 and 12.2); - Co-operation with Codex Alimentarius, World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), and the 
International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) (Article 12.3);  and Dispute settlement activities (Article 11).  
93 I might also suggest the Committee consider two specific reforms.  First, not all members are able to attend the informal 
meetings, yet those are often more important in substance than the formal meetings.  Minutes of those informal meetings 
could be useful for those who miss the meeting. Second, throughout the WTO the practice of taking attendance could set the 
record straight for determining the nature of consensus decision-making.  At present, it is often left unknown which countries 
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meeting.  However, participation at lower level bodies is historically lacking.  Several 
initiatives to improve the depth and quality of participation are taking place.   
At Codex, a FAO-WHO Trust Fund facilitates developing country participation.  The 
Fund has increased attendance at (especially) the main meetings of the Commission.  
However, some interviewed for this study suggested there is room for improvement in 
at least two respects.  First, it changes from year to year which countries receive 
funds to send delegates.  If a country relies on the fund, this negatively affects their 
ability to develop a delegation that has the necessary knowledge and personal 
contacts to perform well.  As mentioned in Section Four of this paper, regular and 
thoughtful participation is an important aspect of wielding influence.  Second, Codex 
procedures should be improved to allow for greater feedback from those delegations 
that are unable to attend meetings.  Statements from such governments can be read 
and entered into the meeting minutes.  Responses can be encouraged. 
Primary Rules about State Obligations 
The second type of rules are the primary rules that tell states what kind of SPS 
measures they can apply to imports and how.  Most of the relatively hard obligations 
states face are created by the SPS Agreement and refined by the SPS Committee and 
the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism.  The issue of equivalence is one example.  It 
is still unclear whether the guidelines created by the SPS Committee work.  No states 
have yet given notice of the establishment of equivalence.  Equivalence is primarily 
important to poor producers that export.  India, for instance, has attempted to 
establish that its measures for maintaining the safety of dairy are equivalent to those 
of the EU.  Mechanical milking (required by the EU) is one way to ensure the safety of 
dairy products, but it is not the only way.  R e q u i r e m e n t s  s u c h  a s  t h i s  w i l l  l i k e l y  
increase, however, as industry and consumers require higher levels of traceability and 
the application of the HACCP system.  The costs associated with complete product 
traceability (especially when one includes inputs) and with implementation of HACCP 
c a n  b e  a  b u r d e n  t o  p o o r  p r o d u c e r s .   I n  this case, and elsewhere, poor producers 
should be concerned that international rules require equivalent outcomes rather than 
processes.
94   
Rules on regionalization (also known as compartmentalization) will likely influence 
poor producer production as well.  Specifically, in some countries it may be the case 
that poor producer interests will be ignored once larger producers are able to 
establish the safety of their product independent of poor producer production.  Even 
worse for poor producers is the possibility that the quest of larger producers to 
establish disease-free compartments or regions would involve the end of smallholder 
production.
95  That said, regionalization also offers some important opportunities for 
developing country exporters.  The challenge will be to ensure that the interests of 
poor producers are considered when regionalization is applied. 
Finally, transparency provisions in the SPS Agreement provide a critical link between 
exporters and importers.  Developing countries regularly find it difficult to stay aware 
of all the measures notified to the WTO and their applicability to their own exports.  
Currently, the SPS Committee is discussing mechanisms to decrease some of this 
burden.
96 
                                                 
94  Related to equivalence are current OIE discussions on the roles played by competent veterinary authorities within 
countries.  On this issue developing countries should stress that equivalent veterinary systems be recognized. It should not be 
necessary that all veterinary authorities be organized similarly or even be public.  A variety of public and private 
partnerships may be equivalent, depending on their contexts. 
95 This could be the case where unregulated smallholders or backyard farmers are considered barriers to the establishment of 
zones or compartments. 
96 Proposals include lengthening the amount of time developing countries have to respond to a notified measure and requiring 
developed countries to directly notify countries that will be affected by new measures. 6. Conclusions and Recommendations 
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Primary Rules:  Standards Relevant to Livestock Food Product Safety 
The third type of rules is the standards themselves.  Examples of such standards were 
provided in the cases in Section Five.  Especially important in the long-term is the 
potential role that maximum residue limits (MRLs) for contaminants can play as 
trade barriers. Here it is beyond the scope of this paper to identify which standards 
are most important to poor producers in all contexts.  However, it is possible to point 
out areas others identify as important and areas currently receiving the attention of 
international standard-setting organizations.  Avian influenza and BSE are examples 
of hot topics.  The regionalization requirements associated with these diseases can be 
of great importance to developing country producers, especially in the case of avian 
influenza.  There is a risk, for example, that poor poultry producers in parts of 
Thailand could be driven out of the poultry market to facilitate recognition of 
regionalization requirements for larger exporters. 
Several issues related to veterinary drugs are important.  One long-standing problem 
for developing countries is that pharmaceutical companies have (at least in the past) 
notified Codex that certain drugs are obsolete and should be disallowed.  The problem 
(especially for poor producers) is that it is not always clear that all of these drugs 
propose a safety risk to either the animals or humans that consume animal products.  
Sometimes it merely is the case that a pharmaceutical company wants to market a 
new drug.
97  Another issue is that of anti-microbial drugs.  There is much concern that 
animals are being over-medicated and/or facilitating the development of antibiotic 
resistance of micro-organisms that also matter for human health.  These are 
legitimate concerns and correct information needs to be transmitted to poor 
producers. 
Despite the general importance of the above issues, in most cases the specific 
standard of concern to poor producers will vary greatly from one country to the next.  
The narrow needs of Mauritanian camel cheese producers provide one example. 
What poor producers (and their advocates) can do 
Given that relevant issues are identified and assessed, what can poor producers and 
their advocates do? 
Poor producers and their advocates have at least four options
98  for influencing the 
development of international food safety rules.  First, since it is countries that make 
the rules and choose how they will implement them domestically, poor producers will 
have the greatest impact if they can influence their own country’s position on an 
issue.  Their ability to do this and their choice of strategies will vary from country to 
country.  Such detail is beyond the scope of the present study.  However, there are a 
few general entry points irrespective of country.  Each country
99 should have an SPS 
contact point and a Codex contact point.  In many cases countries have SPS and Codex 
committees.  These individuals and committees should be a focal point for lobbying 
activity.  In particular, if a committee exists poor producers should apply to have a 
representative as a member of those committees.  If a contact point or committee is 
missing or found lacking, pressure should be placed on the relevant ministries for 
establishing one and to include the input of poor producer interests. 
Related to this participation in national-level institutions, poor producers and their 
advocates can lobby those conducting training of WTO, Codex, and OIE delegates 
(such as the training that is done through the STDF or the Codex Trust Fund) to 
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number of other commodities (most notably coffee), and with some success. 
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include a focus on the relationship between food safety rules, poverty reduction, and 
the needs of poor livestock producers. 
A third route to influencing international rule-making is establishing transnational 
alliances with other poor producers and/or NGOs that share similar concerns.  This is 
an important point as currently there are no groups with specific mandates to 
advocate for poor producers in international food safety rule-making fora.  This puts 
them at a disadvantage compared to the agri-food industry and consumers groups.  At 
the international level the most effective organizations may be those that are truly 
trans-regional in membership.  The OIE, for instance, only allows international 
organizations to observe its main meetings.  Consumers International provides an 
example of an effective advocacy group.  Their strategy documents (available through 
their website) can provide useful information for those seeking to influence Codex. 
Finally, poor producers and their advocates can contribute to the scientific 
understanding of food safety concerns in their unique contexts.  Research can be 
useful in a number of ways.  One, research may be done that suggests alterations to 
current standards are necessary to allow for specific developing country contexts.  For 
instance, establishing the equivalence of a labor-intensive method for accounting for 
product safety as opposed to a capital-intensive method.  Two, research may be done 
that affects current debates on specific standards.  Three, research can support 
developing country claims in disputes concerning an importing country’s unnecessarily 
high standards (or perhaps to justify their own high/different standards).   
Collaboration with veterinary services and international research centers may be 
effective here, as may strategic alliances with the private sector.  
What developing countries can do   
A recent World Bank (2005) report suggests developing countries facing international 
food safety standards have three types of strategies available: 
!  Exit, which implies switching away from certain markets, products, or buyers 
toward others whose standards may be more cost-effectively met.  (Going out of 
business altogether is another form of exit.) 
!  Voice, whereby developing country governments and exporters seek to influence 
the standards that they face through negotiations (with technical agencies in the 
countries of trading partners, for example, or with a major buyer) or through 
formal complaints (via international venues such as the WTO’s SPS Committee). 
!  Compliance, whereby a set of legal, administrative, technical, and organizational 
steps is taken to conform with product or process requirements.” 
This was a paper about Voice, with an emphasis on influencing the actual 
development of international rules.   
While developing country participation in international organizations is historically 
less than that of developed countries there are signs of improvement in participation 
quality in recent years.  Persons interviewed in the course of this study suggested that 
the initial impact of the SPS Agreement may have made it seem against developing 
country interests.  However, many developing countries today are growing savvy and 
are beginning to use the system of rules to protect themselves.
 100 
                                                 
100 Interestingly, some countries seem to be following similar steps in their reactions to the SPS Agreement.  The first step 
tends to involve initial familiarization with the agreement and recognition of its importance.  The second step is compliance.  
Countries will report, for instance, that they are taking measures to ensure that their own health and safety regulations are 
not protectionist.  The third step is less reactive and more proactive.  Countries learn of ways to use the agreement to their 
advantage, to protect exporters from other countries’ protectionist policies, for instance.  None of this is to suggest that 
such a linear path is inevitable, but it does seem to describe the general experiences related by several developing country 
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Recommendations for developing countries include:  
1.  Greater coordination is necessary at the national level,  among both the ministries 
and individuals responsible for developing policy positions in all international food 
safety organizations. 
2.  Countries should send delegates to the WTO, Codex, and OIE on a regular basis.  
[If they do not have the resources, they should plan to coordinate their 
participation with other countries (see next point).]  ; Countries should invest 
those delegates with the authority to make decisions and statements on their 
behalf.  Continuity in delegation is important.  That way, they can develop some 
of the needed expertise and contacts. 
3.  Countries, especially small developing countries and LDCs, should form alliances 
with other like-minded countries on issues of particular concern.  Regional 
organizations may play a crucial role.  Many developing countries could benefit 
from combining resources and expertise at the regional level.  Indeed, for the 
smallest countries this may be the only way to effectively engage other states.  As 
discussed earlier, some regions are already doing this.  Caribbean plans to develop 
a regional organization with a mandate for food safety may provide an example 
for other regions.  Ideally, some of these regional organizations could provide 
some of the technical expertise required to provide standards-relevant scientific 
research. 
4.  Developing countries should lobby for technical assistance to comply with 
international standards and with a goal for complying with private international 
standards as well. 
5.  Developing countries should do more to address the interests of their poor 
producers.  Those working on SPS, Codex, and OIE policy need to work to actively 
include poor producers.  Foreign direct investment may help larger producers 
meet standards but poor, small-scale producers will likely require public funds 
whether they come from developing countries or external technical assistance 
programs such as those implemented by the World Bank.  Ministries responsible for 
developing policy positions and representing the state in the relevant international 
organizations can—in most cases—do more to listen to the concerns of poor 
producers. 
Participation in the development of international food safety standards for livestock 
products is challenging and time-consuming.  It requires a lot of expertise on the part 
of country delegates.  However, the rewards to some poor producers can be great 




ANNEX 1:  EXAMPLES OF LIVESTOCK FOOD PRODUCT HAZARDS 
 
The following is not intended to be a complete list of livestock food product hazards 
but to give the reader a good impression of the range of possible hazards. 
 
Biological Food Hazards 
There are four general types of biological food hazards:  bacterial, parasitic, viral, and 
natural toxins/carcinogens. 
Bacterial Hazards: Salmonella, campylobacter, listeria, e. coli, shigella, yersinia, vibrio 
(cholera), staphylocococcus, clostridium, and bacillus.   
Parasitic Hazards:  Giardia, toxoplasma gondii. 
Viral Hazards: Norwalk-like virus, hepatitis, rotavirus. 
Natural Toxins and Carcinogens: Aflatoxin and other mycotoxins (through feed) 
Chemical and Physical Food Hazards 
There are several important categories of chemical and physical food hazards.  First, 
there are those associated with the processing, storage and preparation of food.  Second, 
there are food additives whose purpose is to enhance some quality of the food, whether 
color or nutrient value.  Finally, there are the environmental, industrial, and agricultural 
contaminants of food.   
From processing, storage and preparation:  Many of the biological hazards mentioned 
above enter the food chain during storage and preparation.  One example is carcinogenic 
nytropyrnes.  Packaging techniques present hazards, including the migration of chemicals 
from plastics to food and the use of lead soldering. 
Additives:  Some food dyes are carcinogenic; nitrites, nitrates, and N-nitroso compounds 
used to preserve meat (among other uses) are regulated.  Some hazards also exist with 
nutrient fortification. 
Environmental, industrial and agricultural contaminants:  dioxin; hexachlorobenzene 
(fungicide by-product that can contaminate animal fat and dairy products; pesticides, 
including mirex, aldrin, dieldrin, chlordane, lindane, heptachlore and ddt; veterinary drug 
residues. 
 
Sources:  Bacon and Sofos (2003); Bhandari (2003); Jackson (2003); Reid (2003);  Rupp (2003); 
Specchio (2003) 
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ANNEX 2:  WTO SPS-RELATED DISPUTES INVOLVING LIVESTOCK FOOD 

















Parties and Nature of Complaint  Timeline  Outcome 
5  US complaint against Korea’s 
shelf-life requirements for frozen 
processed meats and other 
products 
Consultations requested in 
May 1995.  
Korea notified the WTO 
of a mutually agreed 
solution in July 1995. 
26  US complaint against EU’s import 
prohibition for meat produced 
with growth-promoting hormones 
Consultations requested in 
January 1996.  Panel 
requested in April and 
established in May.  In August 
1997 the issued its report.  
After appeal by the EU, the 
Appellate Body issued its 
report and a final decision 
was issued in February 1998. 
US authorised (26-Jul-
99) to raise tariffs by 
100% on EU products 
worth USD 116 million 
p.a. 
48  Canada’s complaint against EU’s 
import prohibition for meat 
produced with growth-promoting 
hormones 
Consultations requested in 
June 1996. Canada’s 
complaint then effectively 
joined the US complaint above 
and followed the same 
timeline. 
Canada authorised (16-
Jul-99) to raise tariffs 
by 100% on EU products 
worth CAD 11.3 million 
p.a. 
100  EU’s complaint against US 
restrictions on imports of poultry 
products 
Consultations requested in 
August 1997. 
No solution reported. 
133  Switzerland’s complaint against 
Slovakia’s BSE-related 
restrictions on cattle and meat 
imports 
Consultations requested in 
May 1998. 
No solution reported. 
279  EU’s complaint about India’s 
import restrictions maintained 
under the Export and Import 
Policy 2002 – 2007 
Consultations requested 
December 2002. 
No solution reported. 
287  EU’s complaint about Australia’s 
quarantine regime for imports 
(including pigmeat) 
Consultations requested April 
2003. 
No solution reported. 
297  Hungary’s complaint about 
Croatia’s measure affecting 
imports of live animals and meat 
products 
Consultations requested July 
2003. 
No solution reported. 
 
Source:  WorldTradeLaw.net (2005)  
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ANNEX 3:  THE HAZARD ANALYSIS CRITICAL CONTROL POINT (HACCP) 
SYSTEM 
In the 1960s, the HACCP system was developed in the United States to help the 
National Aeronautic and Space Administration (NASA) reduce microbial contamination 
for food in longer space travel. The Pillsbury Company brought it to public attention in 
the early 1970s.  Primarily used in the processing sector, primary producers 
increasingly turn to the system as a method for safety control. 
Seven principles are involved in developing and operating a HACCP program: 
1.  Conduct a hazard analysis.  (Assess the hazard, list the steps in the 
process where significant hazard can occur, and describe the 
prevention measures.) 
2.   Determine the Critical Control Points (CCPs). 
3. Establish  critical  limits (for each CCP). 
4.  Establish a system to monitor control of each CCP. 
5.  Establish the corrective action to be taken when monitoring 
indicates that a particular CCP is not under control.  
6.  Establish procedures for verification to confirm that the HACCP 
system is working effectively. 
7.  Establish documentation concerning all procedures and records 
appropriate to these principles and their application. 
 
Codex also provides guidelines for the application of HACCP, with a series of 12 tasks: 
 
Task 1  Assemble the HACCP team 
Task 2 Describe  product 
Task 3  Identify intended use 
Task 4  Construct flow diagram 
Task 5  On-site verification of flow diagram 
Task 6  List all potential hazards, conduct a hazard analysis, 
determine control measures 
Task 7 Determine  CCPs 
Task 8   Establish critical limits for each CCP 
Task 9  Establish a monitoring system for each CCP 
Task 10  Establish corrective action for deviations that may occur 
Task 11 Establish  verification procedures 
Task 12  Establish record keeping and documentation 
 
Sources: Annex to CAC/RCP 1-1969, Rev. 3 (1997);  (Unnevehr and Hirschhorn 2000; Mayes 
2001; Baines, Ryan et al. 2004)  
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ANNEX 4:  CODEX STEPS AND POSSIBLE ACTIONS BY DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES TO INFLUENCE CODEX OUTCOMES 
 
Step  Possible Actions 
1.  Commission decides a standard should be 
elaborated, given its criteria for establishing work 
priorities. Commission decides which subsidiary 
committee or other body will work on the standard. 
!  Promote a standard 
!  Oppose a standard 
!  Seek to influence which committee or 
body works on a standard 
2.  Secretariat or Committee arranges for preparation 
of a proposed draft standard.  Preparation takes into 
account the advice from expert committee (JECFA, 
JMPR, IDF). 
!  Provide scientific advice and 
information 
!  Participate in drafting standard 
3.  Proposed draft standard is sent to members and 
observers for comment. 
!  Comment!  Write a Circular Letter. 
4.  Committee considers comments and may amend the 
proposed draft standard. 
!  If on Committee, make sure enough 
comments have been received from 
developing countries and relevant to 
poor producer interests 
!  Important to participate in debate 
5.  Proposed draft standard submitted to Codex 
Commission or Executive Committee with a view to 
its adoption as a draft standard.  Process takes into 
account member comments and economic 
implications. 
!  Send delegates prepared with facts 
and with authority to make decisions 
and statements on behalf of the 
state.   
!  Write a Circular Letter. 
6.  Begin second round of consultation by repeating 
Step Three 
 
7.  Repeat Step Four in this second round.  !  Write a Circular Letter. 
8.  Commission decides to adopt.  If adopted, it 
becomes a draft standard. 
!  Vote 
 
Sources:  FAO/WHO (2002); Consumers International (2000)  
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ANNEX 5:  OIE STANDARD-SETTING PROCESS AND POSSIBLE ENTRY 
POINTS 
 
Step  Possible Actions 
1.  Director asks an expert group to draft a 
supporting document. 
!  Promote a standard 
!  Oppose a standard 
!  Seek to influence which committee or 
body works on a standard 
2.  Expert group convenes and drafts a proposed 
standard. 
!  Provide scientific advice and information 
3.  Proposed draft standard is sent to members and 
observers for comment. 
!  Comment 
4.  If comments are too technical, experts are 
brought in again to provide advice. 
!  Ask for such advice, if needed. 
5.  Decision is made at annual meeting of the 
International Committee.  Changes are made 
yearly as new scientific advice arrives. 
!  Participate in the meeting. 
!  Continue to contribute to the scientific 
understanding of important food 
safety/animal health issues. 
 




ANNEX 6:  AGRI-FOOD INDUSTRY STATISTICS 
 
Table 1:  World's Largest Meat and Poultry Firms, 2001/2002. 
Firm  Country  Sales (bil $US) 
1.  Tyson Foods, Inc.  U.S.  24.0 
2.  ConAgra Foods  U.S.  13.9 
3.  Excel Corp  U.S.  12 
4.  Nestle SA  Switzerland  10.15 
5.  Swift and Co.  U.S.  8 
6.  Nippon Meat Packers  Japan  7.85 
7.  Smithfield Foods, Inc.  U.S.  7.4 
8.  Farmland Refrigerated  U.S.  4.7 
9.  Danish Crown  Denmark  4.5 
10.  Sara Lee Packaged Meats  U.S.  4.16 
 
Source:  Dyck and Nelson (2003) 
 
Table 2:  World's Largest Dairy Firms (2000). 
Firm  Country  Sales (bil $US) 
1.  Nestle SA  Switzerland  13.0 
2.  Dean Foods  U.S.  9.0 
3.  Dairy Farmers of America  U.S.  6.7 
4.  Kraft Foods  U.S.  6.1 
5.  Danone  France  6.0 
6.  Parmalat  Italy  5.7 
7.  Snow Brands  Japan  5.5 
8.  Lactalis  France  5.1 
9.  Fonterra  New Zealand  5.0 
10.  Unilever  U.K.  5.0 
 
Source:  Dobson and Wilcox (2002) 
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Table 3:  Supermarket News Global Top 25 Retailers (2005). 
Company  No. of 
Stores 
Sales in 




5,164   $244.50   Argentina, Brazil, Canada, China, Germany, Japan, Mexico, 
Singapore, South Korea, United Kingdom, United States, 
Vietnam 
2. Carrefour  10,704  $64.70   Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech 
Republic, Dominican Republic, Egypt, France, Greece, 
Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Oman, Poland, 
Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Singapore, Slovakia, South Korea, 
Spain, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, 
United States  
3. Ahold
b  9,407   $59.20   Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Indonesia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, 
Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, 
Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, United States 
4. Kroger   3,667   $51.80   United States  
5. Metro  2,411  $48.50   Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, China, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Italy, 
Japan, Luxembourg, Morocco, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, 
United Kingdom, Ukraine, Vietnam  
6. Tesco  2,294  $39.50   Czech Republic, Hungary, Ireland, Malaysia, Poland, 
Slovakia, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, United Kingdom, 
United States 
7. Costco  400  $38.00   Canada, Japan, Mexico, South Korea, Taiwan, United 
Kingdom, United States 
8. Albertsons  1,688  $35.60   United States 
9. Rewe 
Zentrale 
12,077  $35.20   Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, France, 
Germany, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, 
Ukraine 
10. Aldi  6,609  $33.7e  Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Spain, United Kingdom, 
United States 
11. Safeway   1,887  $32.40   Canada, United States 
12. ITM 
Enterprises 





23,700  $27.2e  Australia, Canada, China, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Philippines, Spain, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, United States  
14. Edeka   14,374  $27e  Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Poland 
15. Auchan   1,120  $25.90   Angola, Argentina, China, France, Hungary, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Mexico, Morocco, Poland, Portugal, Russia, 
Spain, Taiwan, United States 
16. Sainsbury  681  $25.9e  United Kingdom, United States 
17. Aeon   8,120  $24.6e  Canada, Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, 




7,015  $24.4e  Austria, Canada, China, Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, 




5,342 $21.6e  Austria,  Belgium,  Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom 
20. Casino  9,056  $21.5e  Argentina, Bahrain, Belgium, Brazil, Colombia, Comoros, 
France (incl. Reunion), Lebanon, Madagascar, Mauritius, 
Mexico, Netherlands, Poland, Taiwan, Thailand, Tunisia, 
Uruguay, United States, Venezuela, Vietnam 
21. Delhaize 
Group 
2,520  $19.40   Argentina, Bahrain, Belgium, Brazil, Colombia, Comoros, 
France (incl. Reunion), Lebanon, Madagascar, Mauritius, 
Mexico, Netherlands, Poland, Taiwan, Thailand, Tunisia, 
Uruguay, United States, Venezuela, Vietnam 
22. Leclerc   535  $19.2e   France, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain 
23. Supervalu  1,220  $19.2  United States  
24. Daiei  4,086  $17.7e  China, Japan, United States 
25. Publix   756  $15.90   United States  
 
Notes:  Sales figures are for the latest financial year unless otherwise stated. Companies included 
on the list must have a significant portion of their sales in food. The foreign currency results 
were translated into dollars at current exchange rates. The information came from company 
documents unless otherwise stated. 
 
e = estimate; a = Store nuimbers include Seiyu; b = Ahold is currently in the process of disposing of 
several options in South America and Southeast Asia; c = Ito-Yokado also has franchise 
operations in Denmark, Norway, Singapore, South Korea and Sweden.  Bold signifies the 
company’s headquarters country.  
 




International Agreements and Agreements Between Organizations 
 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1949) 
General Rules of the Office International Des Epizooties (1973) 
GATT Technical Barriers to Trade (1979) 
WTO Agreement (1995) 
WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (1995) 
WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (1995) 
Agreement between World Trade Organization and the OIE (1999) 
Agreement between the Food and Agriculture Organization and the OIE (2004) 
Agreement between the World Health Organization and the OIE (2004) 
Codex Alimentarius Commission Procedural Manual (14
th Edition, 2004) 
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